UNITED
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Security Council

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S/24102
15 June 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 15 JUNE 1992 FROM THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit, enclosed herewith, a joint statement by Dr. Franjo Tudman, President of the Republic of Croatia, and Mr. Alija Izetbegović, President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

I should be grateful if you would circulate this statement as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Prof. Dr. Zdenko ŠKRABALO
Minister

Annex

Joint statement made in Zagreb and Sarajevo on 15 June 1992 by Dr. Franjo Tudman, President of the Republic of Croatia, and Mr. Alija Izetbegović, President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

The President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudman, and the President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr. Alija Izetbegović, hereby express their wish to meet at the earliest convenience in order to talk about the current problems and future relations between the two sovereign and independent States. Both sides regret that in the current circumstances when the brutal aggression is being continued, especially in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, President Izetbegović is unable to leave Sarajevo. Hoping that they will be able to meet soon, the two Presidents have decided to issue the following statement.

JOINT STATEMENT

1. Since the Republic of Croatia has recognized the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has recognized the Republic of Croatia, both Presidents state that the diplomatic relations at the level of embassies should immediately be established.

2. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is grateful to the Republic of Croatia for the humanitarian help and the reception and accommodation of the large number of refugees, citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina who were forced to leave their centuries-old homes, fleeing from the inhuman and savage attacks of military forces of Serbia and Montenegro and the chetnik forces.

3. The Republic of Croatia supports the efforts of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the preservation of independence and its resistance to the aggression and is giving and will continue extending help to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in this respect. The Republic of Croatia also endorses the efforts of the legal Government and the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina in consolidating the defence of the Republic by joining all forms and components of armed resistance into the united armed forces under the command of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, constituted in the spirit of paragraph 4 below.

4. Both Presidents express their full agreement that a political solution for the relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina on the principle of parity of the three constituent nations has to be sought after the cessation of the war.

5. The President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudman, endorses the efforts of the international community aimed at the cessation of

aggression in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the request the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has directed to the international community for help and efficient action in order to prevent further aggression and bring the war operations to an end.

6. Both Presidents agree that the diplomatic-consular representations of both countries will extend, within their competence, all necessary help and services to the citizens of both countries in cases when their respective representations cannot offer that help. Acts committed within the framework of such mutual help will be recognized as valid by both countries.

PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

Dr. Franjo Tudman

PRESIDENT OF THE PRESIDENCY OF THE
REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Alija Izetbegović

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S/24103
16 June 1992
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ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

IDENTICAL LETTERS DATED 11 JUNE 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AZERBAIJAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED RESPECTIVELY TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to inform you that the Azerbaijani Government sets high store by the efforts of the Security Council and the Secretary-General personally to settle the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as reflected in the sending of a United Nations fact-finding mission to the region.

The sending of the United Nations mission was necessitated by the absence of factual information on the essence of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, which is now in its fifth year. Throughout this period, however, members of the United Nations have, as a result of a number of historical and political circumstances, been deprived of officially documented information compiled under the auspices of the Security Council and the Secretary-General.

In the course of the United Nations mission's work in the region, the Azerbaijani side provided it with information on the illegal actions of the Republic of Armenia towards the Azerbaijani Republic, namely: aggression, occupation, annexation, mass killing of the peaceful population, expulsion of the civilian population from territories occupied by means of armed force, the hard fate of the refugees, and the damage and destruction of residential homes, industrial facilities and places of worship. In all, 36 documents were handed over, a list of which is attached.

The Azerbaijani Republic has always advocated openness of information, since it considers that there are no issues which my Republic wishes to conceal from the world community.

All of this gives members of the Security Council the opportunity to acquaint themselves in detail with the problem on the basis of information from an independent source, and to arrive at a just decision.

The leadership and population of the Republic attach great importance to the role of the United Nations in the maintenance of peace and international security.

Just recently released from a totalitarian regime and having restored its independence, the Azerbaijani Republic has chosen as its course the creation of a secular democratic State and has for the first time in its history successfully conducted presidential elections on a multi-party basis. In this connection it must be noted that the aggression by the Armenian Republic, which is a consequence of the predatory annexationist policy of its leadership, is aimed at undermining the foundations of democracy in Azerbaijan and depriving that Republic of the opportunity to achieve political stability, thus creating an extremely complex situation.

Moreover, the valuable multilateral efforts of the international community aimed at resolving the conflict are invariably nullified as a result of the destructive position of the Republic of Armenia. This is confirmed first and foremost by the position Armenia has taken in the talks on the settlement of this problem within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, reflected in the blocking of the constructive decisions proposed by the United States delegation.

Furthermore, on 7 June 1992 the Republic of Armenia began to expand the scale of its aggression, attacking the northwestern regions of Azerbaijan located 250 miles from the Nagorny Karabakh region.

We believe that the United Nations, as one of the most authoritative and influential international organizations, which has established a documentary record of the current state of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, will clearly define and determine the starting-point from which the constructive movement towards a peaceful settlement of this problem must begin.

On the basis of the foregoing, we have the honour to request:

- That the report of the United Nations fact-finding mission on the results of its visit to the region of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict should be distributed as a Security Council document. This will facilitate the reduction of tension in the region and increase the confidence of all parties involved in the conflict in the effectiveness of the United Nations mechanisms called upon to facilitate the solution of international conflicts;

- That, in view of our desire to emphasize our intentions and to cooperate constructively in future in solving this complex problem, the Permanent Representative of the Azerbaijani Republic to the United Nations should, as the initiator of the sending of the United Nations mission to the region, be afforded in accordance with Article 32 of the Charter of the United Nations the opportunity of participating in and addressing the Security Council meeting to discuss the report on the results of the visit by the United Nations mission to the region of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict;

- That the present letter should be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hassan A. HASSANOV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
Azerbaijan to the United Nations

ANNEX

List of documents submitted to the United Nations mission

1. Map of the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic, 1918-1920.

2. Map showing inhabitated locations in the Azerbaijani Republic captured, destroyed and bombed by Armenian armed forces.

3. List of Azerbaijanis massacred in Armenia.

4. Up-to-date information concerning criminal acts of Armenian bandit groups.

5. List of inhabited locations captured by Armenian armed groups in the territory of Azerbaijan.

6. Reports on events in the conflict zone (Ministry of National Security of the Azerbaijani Republic).

7. Reports on events in the conflict zone (Ministry of Defence of the Azerbaijani Republic).

8. Intercepted radio conversations demonstrating Armenia's participation in the organization and execution of operations by bandit groups in the mountainous part of Karabakh and adjacent regions.

9. Notes and statements by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijani Republic.

10. Lists of wounded soldiers.

11. Articles concerning the participation of troops of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in the capture of Khojaly (Publication of the CIS Gyandzha Commando Division entitled Sovetsky voin).

12. List of soldiers killed.

13. Information about Armenia's preparations for the annexation of the mountainous part of Karabakh by force of arms (Ministry of National Security of the Azerbaijani Republic).

14. Information about the development of the situation in the Republic after the Zheleznovodsk communiqué.

15. Results of the analysis of tests for use of chemical weapons (Ministry of Health of the Azerbaijani Republic).

16. Excerpts from the testimony of witnesses concerning the participation of soldiers of the 366th Regiment in the capture of Khojaly.

17. Involvement of the armed forces of the CIS and Armenia in the escalation of tension in the mountainous part of Karabakh.

18. Activities of Armenian international terrorism, including in the territory of Azerbaijan.

19. Investigation material concerning the MTV Mi-8 helicopter disaster of 20 November 1991.

20. Investigation material concerning the capture of Khojaly.

21. Material confirming the participation of CIS forces in joint military actions with Armenian bandit groups during the capture of Khojaly.

22. Summary analysis of bodily injuries of persons killed by Armenian bandits at Khojaly during the night of 25/26 February 1992.

23. Information from the Procurator of the Azerbaijani Republic on crimes committed by Armenian bandit groups during the capture of Khojaly.

24. Information from the Procurator of the Azerbaijani Republic on crimes committed by Armenian bandit groups during the capture of Malybeyli.

25. Conclusion of the forensic examination of the corpse of an unknown child from Khojaly.

26. Conclusion of the forensic examination of the corpse of N. G. Bagirov from Khojaly.

27. Copy of an article from the newspaper Sovetskaya Rossiya of 14 March 1992 concerning crimes committed by Armenian bandits during the capture of Khojaly.

28. Criminal case concerning the murder of the journalist Salatyn Askerov and of two soldiers.

29. Information concerning the nature of the crimes committed by nationals of Armenia in the territory of Azerbaijan since the beginning of the territorial claims of the neighbouring Republic to the Azerbaijani Republic.

30. Blowing up of the Megri railway in Armenia.

31. Air disaster involving the AN-2 aircraft.

32. Material concerning the closing of the Azerbaijani railway in the Megri area of Armenia.

33. Material showing the attempts of the law enforcement agencies of Nagorny Karabakh to absolve criminals from responsibility.

34. Brochure on Armenian terrorism; its author was killed as a result of Armenians' sabotage in Karabakh.

35. Brochure entitled "The undeclared war".

36. Videocassette containing material concerning Armenia's aggression against Azerbaijan and the crimes of the Armenian bandits in Khojaly.

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Security Council

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S/24104
16 June 1992
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ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 16 JUNE 1992 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVES OF BELGIUM, FRANCE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

We have the honour to bring to your attention the text, in French and English, of a declaration on the situation in Yugoslavia adopted by the European Community and its member States at their ministerial meeting held at Luxembourg on 15 June 1992 (see annex).

We should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Paul NOTERDAEME
Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations

(Signed) Jean-Marc ROCHEREAU DE LA SABLIERE
Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations

(Signed) Thomas L. RICHARDSON
Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom to the United Nations

Annex

[Original: English/French]

Declaration on the situation in Yugoslavia

The Community and its member States recall their support for United Nations Security Council resolution 757 (1992) and stress once again the need for its full implementation. The sole purpose of the sanctions decided upon is to find a peaceful and equitable solution to the Yugoslav crisis. They are not motivated by hostility against the Serbian and Montenegran people.

The Community and its member States welcome and support United Nations Security Council resolution 758 (1992) of 8 June and the steps taken by the Secretary-General to secure the reopening of Sarajevo airport for humanitarian purposes under the exclusive authority of the United Nations, and with the assistance of UNPROFOR. They welcome the active participation of Member States in this operation. They are ready to assist the Secretary-General in any manner which would facilitate the immediate delivery of urgently needed humanitarian supplies to Sarajevo and other destinations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They also call upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully with UNPROFOR and international humanitarian agencies in achieving their aim of helping the long-suffering people of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Community and its member States also support the establishment of a security zone encompassing Sarajevo and its airport, and express the hope that this may be the beginning of a process of normalization which will bring peace to Bosnia and Herzegovina in its entirety. They welcome the last cease-fire brokered by the United Nations and urge all parties to respect it. In this context, they also take note of the unilateral measures announced by the Serbs of Bosnia, expect that they will comply with these, and call upon the other parties in the conflict to reciprocate.

The Community and its member States welcome Lord Carrington's decision to visit Sarajevo with Ambassador Cutileiro, once the airport has been reopened, to reconvene the talks on future constitutional arrangements for Bosnia and Herzegovina held under the aegis of the EC Peace Conference. They reaffirm once again that only a political negotiated settlement on the basis of the principles agreed by the three main political parties of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 18 March 1992 may bring a lasting and just solution to the outstanding problems of the Republic.

The Community and its member States, therefore, urge the leaders of those parties to fully assume their historical responsibilities and call upon them to state publicly and unreservedly their readiness to resume the constitutional talks and their willingness to participate in them in good faith.

The Community and its member States noted that the situation in Kosovo is potentially dangerous and urge all parties to show the necessary restraint and sense of responsibility. They urge the authorities in Belgrade to refrain from further repression and engage in serious dialogue with representatives of Kosovo. Failure to do so would impede their prospect for the restoration of normal relations with the international community. The Community and its member States recall that frontiers can only be changed by peaceful means and remind the inhabitants of Kosovo that their legitimate quest for autonomy should be dealt with in the framework of the EC Peace Conference. They also call upon the Albanian Government to exercise restraint and to act constructively.

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General Assembly Security Council

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A/47/275
S/24105
16 June 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-seventh session
Item 69 of the preliminary list*
REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
DECLARATION ON THE STRENGTHENING
OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-seventh year

Note verbale dated 15 June 1992 from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia addressed to the Secretary-General

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour of transmitting the statement by the Government of the Republic of Slovenia (see annex) of 15 June 1992, with regard to the statement of the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of 5 June 1992.

It would be greatly appreciated if this document could be distributed to the Member States as a document of the General Assembly, under item 69 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

* A/47/50.

ANNEX

Statement issued on 15 June 1992 by the
Government of the Republic of Slovenia

The Republic of Slovenia fully supports resolution 757 (1992) of the United Nations Security Council in all its aspects, including its tenth preambular paragraph, in which the Security Council noted "... that the claim by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations has not been generally accepted". The Security Council refers to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a former state. As explained in the letter of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia, Dr. Dimitrij Rupel, to the President of the United Nations General Assembly and to the President of the United Nations Security Council (A/47/234-S/24028) that former state has dissolved and has ceased to exist.

By expressing its view that the non-existing state called "Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" has no legal basis to continue its membership in the United Nations and other international organizations, the Republic of Slovenia does not interfere in the internal affairs of any State. It only wishes to put on record its opinion that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot continue the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations and other international organizations, an opinion shared by many other States.

The Republic of Slovenia is following with attention and great concern the development of the situation on the territory of former Yugoslavia. It fully endorses the efforts of the European Community, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the United Nations to achieve a peaceful solution to the crisis on this territory, to restore peace on the territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and to develop durable political solutions for the future in that area.

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Security Council

Distr.
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S/24106
16 June 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: SPANISH

LETTER DATED 15 JUNE 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF PERU TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to refer to your note dated 3 June 1992, concerning Security Council resolution 757 (1992).

In that connection, on instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that, pursuant to the provisions of paragraphs 4 to 9 of resolution 757 (1992), the Peruvian Government has taken steps to ensure that the competent Peruvian sectors adopt appropriate measures with a view to the immediate implementation of those provisions.

(Signed) Ricardo V. LUNA
Permanent Representative

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Distr.
GENERAL

S/24107
16 June 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 16 JUNE 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government and further to our letters concerning violations of Iraqi airspace by the United States Air Force, I have the honour to inform you that United States aircraft dropped incendiary bombs on Iraqi fields, which resulted in fires and hampered harvesting, as follows:

1. On 7 June 1992, at 1543 hours, a United States aircraft dropped an incendiary bomb on a wheat-harvest collection area in the Bakhaira region.

2. On 9 June 1992, at 1330 hours, a United States aircraft dropped incendiary bombs on the bank of one of the two wadis in the proximity of agricultural land in the Muhallabiyah zone.

3. On 10 June 1992, at 1830 hours, a fire broke out in the fields of Tarjala village, situated in Kalak District (Ninawa Governorate), on which United States aircraft had dropped incendiary bombs.

These cowardly attacks constitute a flagrant and unjustified violation of the cease-fire and reveal the falseness of the futile and slanderous United States assertions that the aircraft in question were carrying out observation operations in implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council. These attacks also reveal in the clearest possible fashion the covert aims of the United States, which are to cause physical and material harm to our people.

In informing you of these new violations, I request you to take the necessary steps pursuant to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations with a view to halting these acts of aggression and preventing them from recurring.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abd al-Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24108
16 June 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Security Council a report submitted by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

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Annex

Third report by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991)

INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is the third report by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991). It is provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 699 (1991) to cover the period 4 December 1991 to 10 June 1992. This report summarizes developments since the previous report a/ in order to provide, together with the first report of the Executive Chairman, b/ a comprehensive picture of the establishment and functioning of the Special Commission since the adoption of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

2. The report itself highlights the principal developments and activities. It also gives the Executive Chairman's assessment of the results achieved, the difficulties encountered and what remains to be done to secure full implementation of the requirements of the relevant Security Council resolutions. Where necessary, separate appendices give a more detailed account of specific aspects of the Commission's work during the period under review.

I. ORGANIZATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES

3. In the period under review, there have been two changes in the composition of the Commission. On 5 February 1992, the Deputy Executive Chairman, Mr. Robert Gallucci (United States of America) resigned to take up important new responsibilities in Washington, D.C. The Executive Chairman would like to take this opportunity to express his thanks to Mr. Gallucci for his invaluable services to the Commission and for his unfailing support and to pay a tribute to his contributions in the field, including participation in some of the most difficult inspections in Iraq, in which he amply demonstrated both his courage and his diplomatic skill. The Secretary-General appointed Mr. Michael Newlin (United States) as Deputy Executive Chairman in succession to Mr. Gallucci. Mr. Newlin, who has served as United States Ambassador to the United Nations Organizations in Vienna, has considerable experience in the nuclear field and the Office of the Special Commission has already benefited greatly from this, particularly in its collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

4. In March 1992, the Executive Chairman learned with great regret of the untimely death of Mr. Ken Adachi (Japan), who had played such a valuable part in the work of the Special Commission and, in particular, the

Chemical/Biological Weapons Group. The Secretary-General has appointed Mr. Hideyo Kurata (Japan) to replace Mr. Adachi.

5. The organizational structure remains essentially as described in the first report of the Executive Chairman. The Office of the Executive Chairman has been supplemented by the addition of an Information Assessment Unit, which is now operational. The Field Offices in Bahrain and Baghdad continue effectively to service and support the surveillance activities.

6. Finances continue to require attention in the absence of Iraqi agreement to sell oil under the terms of Security Council resolution 706 (1991). The Commission's operations are supported by contributions in cash and in kind from a number of Member States. Further information on organizational and administrative issues is contained in appendix V.

7. The Executive Chairman wishes once again to place on record his profound appreciation to the Secretary-General, to Governments and to the agencies concerned for the assistance made available, as well as to the able staff placed at the disposal of the Commission for the dedicated service they have rendered, sometimes in very trying and dangerous circumstances, to carry out the mandate of the Security Council.

II. STATUS, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

8. The status, privileges and immunities of the Special Commission, IAEA and the United Nations specialized agencies involved in the implementation of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) continue to be regulated by the various agreements and Council resolutions and decisions mentioned in paragraph 5 of the first report. b/ By an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the Director-General of IAEA on the one hand, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bahrain on the other, the agreement in respect of the Commission's field office in Manama has been extended for a further period of six months, to 29 September 1992. Issues which have arisen in Iraq in the implementation of the status, privileges and immunities of the Commission have been principally in connection with the operation and landing rights of the Commission's aircraft, where difficulties persist (see appendix I).

III. DEVELOPMENTS

A. Political developments: the attitude of Iraq

9. In the period under review, the Special Commission and IAEA have continued to conduct vigorous inspections of sites declared by Iraq or designated by the Commission. These inspections have served as the main source for compiling a picture of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and the capabilities for their production. Although cooperation has been extended, in most instances, to inspectors at the field level, Iraq's authorities have not been uniformly forthcoming in providing information on the weapons programmes

as a whole. The problems which were emerging in the first five months of the operation have crystallized, and thus the emphasis of the work of the Commission has shifted in the period under review from concentration on the organization of inspections to seeking compliance with the resolutions and decisions of the Security Council. The major developments in this regard are described in detail in appendix I. Broadly speaking, the problems may be summarized as follows:

(a) The Commission's task has always been viewed as having three phases: inspection and survey; destruction; and long-term ongoing monitoring and verification to ensure that Iraq does not reacquire proscribed weapons. Although these three phases will overlap to a large extent, the intention was that the emphasis should shift with time from the first through to the third phase. However, on 19 November 1991, the Iraqi authorities informed the President of the Security Council that Iraq considered that the Commission's and IAEA's plans for future ongoing monitoring and verification, approved under Security Council resolution 715 (1991), were unlawful.

(b) Furthermore, Iraq has failed to provide the initial declarations required under the plans for future ongoing monitoring and verification, which are important for the identification of which facilities, materials and activities would need to be monitored under the plans. On 5 June 1992, Iraq transmitted to the Commission documents containing what it has characterized as a comprehensive version of the complete activities of the Iraqi nuclear programme and biological activities and ballistic missiles. These documents, which should correspond to the full, final and complete disclosures required under Council resolution 707 (1991), are now being analysed by the Commission and IAEA. An assessment of these documents will be transmitted to the Council as soon as possible to complement the present report.

(c) The situation is further aggravated by the continuing obstructions that the Iraqi authorities have been putting in the way of the Commission's landing rights for fixed-wing aircraft and their increasing criticism of the Commission's high-altitude surveillance flights.

Thus, the realization of the intentions to proceed with the evolution of the Commission's activities from inspection and survey through destruction to ongoing monitoring and verification have so far been in large part delayed by the actions of the Iraqi Government.

10. In response to a special report on the situation by the Executive Chairman, the Security Council declared that Iraq was in material breach of resolution 687 (1991) and dispatched a high-level mission, headed by the Executive Chairman, to Iraq, armed with a statement demanding that Iraq give the necessary assurances on compliance with the Council's resolutions or face serious consequences. That mission visited Iraq from 21 to 24 February 1992. In its report c/ it concluded that unconditional agreement by Iraq had not been provided and that, therefore, the initiation and practical implementation of resolution 715 (1991) and the plans approved thereunder for ongoing monitoring and verification could not be undertaken in a credible manner.

Partly coinciding with the mission, Iraq refused to permit the start of the destruction of equipment associated with its ballistic missile production programme. Upon being apprised of the situation, the Security Council condemned the failure by Iraq to comply with its obligations to destroy equipment as directed by the Council and to make the declarations required under the Council's resolutions. Furthermore the Security Council reiterated its statement that Iraq was in material breach of resolution 687 (1991).

11. The Security Council met in formal session on 11 and 12 March 1992. In an initial statement, the President of the Council, on behalf of all members, reiterated the Council's position. The Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Mr. Tariq Aziz, made two statements, neither of which contained the assurances sought by the Council. The Council furthermore heard statements by all its members, by the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the United Nations, by the Director-General of IAEA and by the Executive Chairman of the Commission. The Chairman in his statement indicated that, although it was the aim of the Commission to report to the Council as soon as possible that Iraq was in substantial compliance with section C of resolution 687 (1991), no question of this could arise until Iraq had acknowledged and implemented its obligations under all the relevant Council resolutions and decisions. In a concluding statement on 12 March, the President of the Council, on behalf of the Council, stated that Iraq must immediately take steps to comply fully and unconditionally with its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions.

12. Following the Council's meeting, Iraq made additional declarations concerning the numbers of ballistic missiles, chemical weapons and associated items. Furthermore, it declared its readiness to go along with the required destruction of buildings and equipment. Subsequently, destruction of such items, relevant to the missile and nuclear weapons programmes, have been carried out. As referred to above, the Iraqi authorities have handed over to the Special Commission what they called "full, final and complete reports" on chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles as well as on its nuclear programme. These reports are now being studied by the Special Commission and IAEA to assess whether they meet the requirements of the relevant Security Council resolutions. However, neither the initial declarations required under the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification nor the acknowledgement of Iraq's obligations have been received.

B. Operational developments

13. With regard to chemical weapons, although verification and survey activities continue, there has been a progressive shift in emphasis with relatively more time and resources being devoted to issues directly related to the destruction of Iraq's identified chemical weapons (CW) assets. At Khamisiyah, the Special Commission has supervised the first destruction of filled chemical munitions, while at the Muthanna site work is progressing to construct chemical agent destruction plants. The aim is to have these plants commissioned during the summer of 1992. A new development was the Iraqi

admission of 19 March 1992 that it had omitted to declare 24,470 chemical munitions and that these weapons had been unilaterally destroyed in direct contravention of resolution 687 (1991), which requires that possession of Iraq's chemical weapons should be yielded to the Commission for destruction, removal or rendering harmless under its supervision. An inspection team has since been able to verify, by examining the excavated remains of the munitions, that the numbers contained in the Iraqi declarations were substantially correct.

14. There have been few developments on the biological side. Inspection activities have continued through joint chemical and biological teams.

15. Regarding ballistic missiles, the emphasis has shifted to the destruction of facilities associated with Iraq's production programme. The Executive Chairman informed the Iraqi authorities that destruction should start in February 1992. Initially, as recorded in the report of the Secretary-General of 7 March 1992, d/ Iraq delayed and refused to comply. Only at the end of March 1992 did Iraq allow the destruction of these facilities to begin. This destruction programme is now advanced.

16. Meanwhile, inspection activities also continued, with Iraq maintaining that it no longer had any missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and hence that there was no further missile destruction to be done. Confronted, however, with the information that the Special Commission had incontrovertible evidence that Iraq's initial declarations of April 1991 had not included a substantial number of ballistic missiles and related equipment then in its possession, Iraq presented on 19 March 1992 a new declaration. In it Iraq admitted that it had failed to declare 92 proscribed ballistic missiles and much associated equipment and vehicles, including mobile missile launchers, and that it had destroyed these unilaterally, in contravention of resolution 687 (1991), in the summer of 1991. Inspection teams since then have been able to verify that the numbers contained in this new declaration were substantially correct.

17. However, although events have proceeded more smoothly at the field level than at the political level, there have been occasions when there has been deliberate interference with inspection activities, e.g. tampering with equipment designated for removal by inspection teams for further analysis and doctoring of documentation. Such interference, coupled with Iraq's failure to date to provide the full, final and complete disclosure required under resolution 707 (1991), can only be interpreted as evidence that Iraq is still seeking to conceal from the Special Commission information directly relevant to section C of resolution 687 (1991).

C. Health and safety

18. A matter of increasing concern as the Special Commission moves into the destruction phase is the fact that many of the activities carried out by the Commission in Iraq are potentially very hazardous. Sufficient information and

experience have been gained in the first six months of operations by the Commission to provide a basis for a realistic health and safety policy document. The Chemical and Biological Weapons Working Group, during the course of its discussions of safety issues, decided in December 1991 to prepare such a document and delegated to the Destruction Advisory Panel the task of preparing a draft. The draft was prepared by the Panel during its meeting in February 1992 and was reviewed by the CBW Working Group during its meeting in April 1992.

19. Environmental aspects of the activities of the Special Commission have also been given thorough consideration by the Destruction Advisory Panel. In particular, environmental and safety issues have been at the forefront of their consideration of chemical destruction activities. The situation at many sites, particularly at the Muthanna State Establishment, is already leading to local environmental contamination which requires rapid solutions. A short paper giving details of the factors considered and the technical steps taken to minimize environmental contamination during chemical destruction operations has been prepared for the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).

IV. ISSUES AND PRIORITIES FOR THE FUTURE

20. Although much has been achieved by the Special Commission, clearly much remains to be done. In particular, the following require action before the Commission can report to the Security Council that Iraq is in substantial compliance with its obligations:

(a) The destruction, removal or rendering harmless of Iraq's prohibited weapons capabilities - i.e. equipment and facilities associated with its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles programmes and the successful initiation of destruction of Iraq's stocks of chemical munitions, agents and precursors;

(b) Acknowledgement by Iraq of its obligations under Council resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991);

(c) Verification by the Commission of the accuracy and adequacy of the data provided in Iraq's "full, final and complete report";

(d) Declarations by Iraq under the plans adopted through resolution 715 (1991), with regard to, inter alia, dual capable facilities used for permitted purposes but which could be used for prohibited purposes;

(e) The initiation and smooth functioning of the plans for future ongoing monitoring and verification to ensure that Iraq does not reacquire prohibited capabilities;

(f) Acceptance by Iraq of the Special Commission's aircraft landing rights.

21. The priority at the moment is to obtain from Iraq its acknowledgement of its obligations under resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991), and the declarations due under the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification of its obligations not to reacquire those proscribed items. On the operational side, immediate attention needs to be given to the continuing obstruction facing the Special Commission with regard to landing rights for the fixed-wing aircraft. The verification and assessment of Iraq's reports transmitted on 5 June on its weapons programmes is furthermore already under way.

22. Work progresses on the destruction, removal or rendering harmless, as appropriate, of the items covered by section C of resolution 687 (1991) and thought is being given to which facilities will have to be subject to the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification. As the Special Commission moves further into the verification and monitoring phases, more consideration will have to be given to funding and staffing of these more permanent activities. The issue of import monitoring will, prior to the lifting or easing of sanctions, need to be addressed in coordination with the sanctions Committee established by the Security Council under its resolution 661 (1990).

Notes

a/ S/23268.

b/ S/23165, annex.

c/ See S/23643.

d/ S/23687.

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Appendix I

Political developments

1. In the period under review it has been necessary to devote much time and effort to seeking to obtain from Iraq three of the essential elements outstanding in the implementation of the Special Commission's mandate, namely:

(a) The full, final and complete disclosure, as required by Security Council resolution 687 (1991), of all aspects of Iraq's programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres, and of all holdings of such weapons, their components and production facilities and locations, as well as all other nuclear programmes;

(b) Acknowledgement of Iraq's obligations under Security Council resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991) and under the plans of the Special Commission and of IAEA for ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's obligations approved by resolution 715 (1991); a/

(c) Provision of the declarations called for under the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification.

Much time and effort have also been devoted to seeking to resolve difficulties arising in connection with the second phase of the Special Commission's activities relating to the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of weapons of mass destruction and the relevant associated facilities. Certain difficulties in connection with the Special Commission's air operations have also continued.

A. Ongoing monitoring and verification

2. An express acknowledgement by Iraq is necessary, not only of its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) but also under resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991), to ensure Iraq's continued compliance with its obligations not to reacquire prohibited weapons. Ongoing monitoring and verification cannot be implemented without a clear picture and understanding of Iraq's programmes for weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles as they existed before the conflict in the Persian Gulf and without full and verified declarations, required under the plans, which cover both military and civilian sites, facilities, materials and other items or activities that could be used in contravention of Iraq's obligations under section C of resolution 687 (1991).

3. The Special Commission's and IAEA's plans for ongoing monitoring and verification called for the submission by Iraq of its initial declarations by 10 November 1991. By letter of 19 November 1991 to the President of the Security Council, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq criticized the plans as being "aimed at objectives incompatible with the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter, the norms of international law and international and humanitarian pacts and covenants". Under cover of the same letter, the

Minister for Foreign Affairs transmitted "information required under resolution 687 (1991) that comes under the mandate of the Special Commission". This information did not correspond to the declarations required under the plans.

4. The Security Council's attention was drawn by the Executive Chairman to this situation in his second report submitted to the Security Council on 4 December 1991 b/ and it was elaborated upon in the Secretary-General's report to the Council of 25 January 1992 on the status of Iraq's compliance with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. c/ On 31 January 1992, the Security Council met at the level of heads of State and Government and, in the President's statement issued at the conclusion of that meeting, d/ it was, inter alia, provided, with reference to the Council's resolutions on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, that those resolutions "remain essential to the restoration of peace and stability in the region and must be fully implemented".

5. Also late in January 1992, the Executive Chairman sent a special mission, headed by two Special Commission members, to Baghdad to seek from the Iraqi authorities the undertakings referred to in paragraph 1 above. Although that mission was able to report some progress in obtaining through an interrogative procedure information on Iraq's programmes to acquire or produce weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, it was not able to obtain the undertakings required and, on resolution 715 (1991), the Government of Iraq affirmed its position as stated in the letter of 19 November 1991 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

6. Faced with such a situation, the Executive Chairman, on 18 February 1992, submitted a special report e/ to the Security Council in which he concluded that the position taken by Iraq was such that it was neither legally nor practically possible for the Special Commission to carry out effectively a programme of ongoing monitoring and verification of the nature and scope approved by the Council. On 19 February 1992, the President of the Council issued a statement, on behalf of its members, f/ expressing, inter alia, their grave concern at Iraq's position which constituted "a continuing material breach of the relevant provisions of resolution 687 (1991)", and supporting the decision of the Secretary-General to dispatch a high-level mission headed by the Executive Chairman of the Commission "to visit Iraq immediately to meet and discuss with the highest levels of the Iraqi Government for the purpose of securing the unconditional agreement by Iraq to implement all its relevant obligations under resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 715 (1991)".

7. The high-level mission, headed by the Executive Chairman, visited Baghdad from 21 to 24 February 1992. In his report submitted to the Council on 26 February, g/ the Executive Chairman concluded that he was not able to secure "from the highest levels of the Government of Iraq unconditional agreement by Iraq to implement all its relevant obligations under Security Council resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 715 (1991)". As regards the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification, the Executive Chairman reported that Iraq "accepted only the principle of ongoing monitoring and verification,

and this is subject to considerations of sovereignty, territorial integrity, national security and non-infringement on Iraq's industrial capabilities". The Executive Chairman's report indicated that the Iraqi authorities had referred to their intention to dispatch a high-level delegation to New York, and that "the Iraqi delegation dispatched to talk to the Security Council will convey Iraq's position on resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991)".

8. On 28 February 1992, the President of the Security Council made a statement on behalf of its members, h/ deploring and condemning Iraq's failure to provide the undertakings sought by the high-level mission, approving in full the conclusions of the mission and demanding "that Iraq immediately implement all its obligations under Council resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent resolutions on Iraq".

9. On 7 March 1992, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council, at its request, an update of his report of 25 January 1992 on Iraq's compliance with the obligations placed upon it by resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent resolutions. i/ In annex I to that report, containing information received from the Special Commission, attention was again drawn, inter alia, to Iraq's failure to acknowledge and implement its obligations under Council resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991) and under the plans approved by resolution 715 (1991).

10. On 11 and 12 March 1992 an Iraqi delegation, headed by the Deputy Prime Minister, appeared before the Security Council. At the outset of that meeting, the President of the Council made a statement on behalf of its members j/ in which he recalled in some detail the Council statements of 19 and 28 February 1992, referred to above.

11. The Deputy Prime Minister addressed the Council on 11 March 1992 and on 12 March he responded to questions addressed to him by members of the Council. k/ The unconditional assurances which the Council had been seeking were not forthcoming on either occasion. In his initial statement he said that Iraq had already provided the Special Commission with all the necessary information on its proscribed weapons and production facilities. He further disclosed for the first time that Iraq had unilaterally destroyed 270,000 proscribed items after the adoption of resolution 687 (1991). He also stated that Iraq was ready to reach a practical mechanism regarding the issue of equipment proscribed under paragraph 8 of resolution 687 (1991), with a view to rendering that equipment harmless. In regard to ongoing monitoring and verification, the Deputy Prime Minister stated that Iraq was prepared to cooperate, while underlining the need for respect for Iraqi dignity, sovereignty and national security. In his response to questions, he basically affirmed the positions he had set forth the previous day.

12. Speaking in the Council on 11 March 1992 after the Deputy Prime Minister, the Executive Chairman underlined that the fundamental aim of the Commission was to report to the Council that Iraq had met in full all its obligations under section C of resolution 687 (1991) as elaborated upon in resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991). However, the Commission's ability to do so was

conditioned by the degree of cooperation which it received from Iraq and the openness and transparency of that State. Although Iraq claimed to have provided all necessary information on its proscribed programmes and weapons, that was not the case. The information given was not complete, systematic or supported by the documentary and material evidence necessary to verify it. With regard to the items declared to have been destroyed unilaterally, the Commission had requested a list fully accounting for all those items but had not received it. Such unilateral destruction had been contrary to resolution 687 (1991) and apparently on a scale which indicated that many gaps remained, which Iraq must fill, in the picture of its prohibited weapons programmes. Turning to the second phase of the Commission's operations, the Executive Chairman acknowledged that Iraq's cooperation had been good in regard to the destruction of actual weapons declared by Iraq. However, another situation prevailed in regard to the production facilities for such weapons where Iraq was, for instance, refusing to comply with the Commission's decisions in respect of the destruction of certain missile-producing facilities. Likewise, regarding the third phase of the Commission's activities, namely ongoing monitoring and verification, the existence of an impasse had now clearly been established. If the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification approved by the Council appeared intrusive, that was in large measure a result of the conduct of Iraq. If Iraq cooperated, the intrusive elements need not be invoked. The Executive Chairman concluded by saying that until Iraq undertook to comply with the Council's decisions in full, and confirmed such an undertaking in practice, the possibility of the Special Commission's certifying Iraq's compliance with its obligations under section C of resclution 687 (1991) did not even arise.

13. On 12 March 1992, the President of the Council made a statement, on behalf of the Council, in which, with reference to "the extent of compliance by the Government of Iraq with its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions" he recorded that "the Government of Iraq has not yet complied fully and unconditionally with those obligations, must do so and must immediately take the appropriate actions in this regard". The President's statement concluded with the Council's hope that "the goodwill expressed by the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq will be matched by deeds".

14. On 12 and 13 March 1992, when the Iraqi delegation appeared before the Security Council, an Iraqi team met with the Executive Chairman and other officials of the Commission. The latter provided to the former detailed explanations as to the format and modalities required by the Special Commission's plan for ongoing monitoring and verification under its different sections and annexes. The Iraqi team promised to provide, by early April, the information required under the plan except on the sources of imported items and on operational deployment or disposition of relevant weapons. The Commission's side stressed, however, that the information should be provided in full as required by the plan.

15. On 10 April 1992, the Secretary-General, as required by paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 715 (1991), submitted to the Council a report on the status of the implementation of the Special Commission's plan for the

ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with relevant parts of section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991). l/ A similar report on the implementation of IAEA's plan was submitted by the Director-General of the Agency. m/ The Secretary-General's report, after recounting pertinent details on the developments outlined above, concluded that Iraq had not been in compliance with Security Council resolutions nor with the plans. The members of the Council decided that the President of the Council should convey to the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations that Iraq's compliance with the plans was imperative. He did this on 22 April 1992. No formal reply to this approach has been made. However, on 26 May 1992, the Executive Chairman received a letter from the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Iraq n/ in which the latter mentioned drafts of the declarations required under the plan but made no promise of when the final declaration might be received. The letter also reiterated the position taken by the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq on 11 March 1992 on the issue of Iraq's acknowledgement of its obligations under resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991) and on how the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification should be implemented. The plan itself contains precise methods for implementation which have been approved by the Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

B. Destruction, removal or rendering harmless of proscribed items

16. Another issue to which much time and attention has had to be devoted in the period under review relates to the second phase of the Special Commission's operations, namely the disposal of weapons of mass destruction, facilities and other items related thereto through destruction, removal or rendering harmless, as appropriate, as provided for in resolution 687 (1991). For the Special Commission the issue has arisen mainly in connection with Iraq's ballistic missile production capabilities and for IAEA in connection with the Iraqi complex at Al-Atheer, the technical core of which was intended for the special processes needed for nuclear weapons development and manufacturing. In the area of the disposal of Iraq's chemical weapons and precursors, the Iraqi authorities have continued their earlier cooperation and have been working on the construction of hydrolysis and incineration facilities at the Al-Muthanna site which should be operational and meet the Special Commission's safety and environment requirements in the near future (see appendix II). Throughout the planning, development work and execution of chemical destruction operations, relations with Iraq have generally been much more relaxed, technically detailed and businesslike compared with the inspection activities. The better atmosphere thus generated has undoubtedly contributed to the timely and satisfactory progress made in this area.

17. Under paragraph 9 (b) (ii) of resolution 687 (1991), Iraq is required to destroy, under the supervision of the Special Commission, all its proscribed missile capabilities, including launchers. On 14 February 1992, the Executive Chairman addressed a letter to the Iraqi authorities concerning the destruction of certain missile facilities and transmitting lists of items which must be destroyed and items for further consideration and decision. o/

18. A ballistic missile team sent to Iraq on 21 February met, however, with a request for delay. The Executive Chairman, who was in Baghdad at the time for the high-level mission, agreed to a brief delay in the scheduled date for commencing destruction. After he left Iraq, however, the Iraqi authorities refused to comply, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs instead sending a letter to the Executive Chairman p/ reiterating his earlier proposal to reuse equipment for the BADR-2000 ballistic missile project for a variety of what were stated to be "civilian purposes" and for the manufacture of 100-kilometre range missiles. Upon receipt of Iraq's decision not to proceed with the destruction of the items concerned, the Executive Chairman ordered the team to withdraw from Iraq.

19. On 28 February 1992, the Security Council met to consider the report by the Executive Chairman g/ on the results of the special mission sent to Iraq pursuant to the statement of the President of the Security Council of 19 February 1992. In introducing his report in Security Council consultations on 27 and 28 February 1992, the Executive Chairman informed the Council orally of Iraq's failure to comply with the Special Commission's decisions on the destruction of the missile capabilities concerned. The President of the Council, in the statement which he issued on 28 February 1992 at the conclusion of those consultations, h/ recorded, inter alia, that the members of the Council deplored and condemned Iraq's failure to commence destruction of the equipment concerned and reaffirmed that it was for the Special Commission alone to determine which items must be destroyed under paragraph 9 of resolution 687 (1991), its failure in this regard being a further material breach of the relevant provisions of resolution 687 (1991).

20. An account of the foregoing developments was given in the Secretary-General's further report i/ of 7 March 1992, referred to in paragraph 9 above, and the President's statement of 28 February 1992 was repeated in paragraph 18 of the introductory statement j/ made by the President on behalf of the Council on 11 March 1992, when the Council met with the participation of the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq. On 19 March 1992, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, in a letter to the Executive Chairman, confirmed that Iraq was ready to carry out the destruction as required by the Commission.

21. On 7 April 1992, the Executive Chairman sent a letter to the Iraqi authorities transmitting the updated versions of annex A, on items which must be destroyed, and annex B, on items for further consideration and decisions. This update resulted from the findings of UNSCOM inspections and the review of Iraq's suggestions and requests.

22. During the period 21 to 30 March 1992, a ballistic missile team oversaw the destruction of nine items of equipment and, during the period 13 to 21 April 1992 another team supervised the destruction of the majority of the remaining items in the extended List A. g/ Developments up to 1 April 1992 were reported to the President of the Security Council in a letter of 2 April 1992 from the Executive Chairman.

C. Inspection and survey

23. The Iraqi declarations of 19 and 28 March 1992, referred to in paragraph 12 of the present report, while evidencing some shift by Iraq towards greater openness, have at the same time proven that the Iraqi authorities have not only deliberately misled the Special Commission by omission but have also actively falsified the evidence. Thus, perhaps paradoxically, this potential shift towards more transparency, while welcomed if it heralds a real shift towards a fully cooperative attitude on the part of the Government of Iraq, has taken place under circumstances that justify the Commission's scepticism of Iraq's declarations in the past. It also indicates that, at least for the immediate future, new declarations will also have to be closely scrutinized and that the Commission will have to continue with its programme of inspection and survey missions.

24. Throughout the period, relations at the field level between inspection teams and their Iraqi counterparts have been generally satisfactory. However, there have been some instances of obstruction by Iraq and, on one occasion, actual physical harassment. By contrast, the better relations established between those involved in the preparations for chemical weapons destruction prove that a more cooperative approach by Iraq benefits both sides in terms of efficiency and timeliness.

D. The Commission's air operations

25. Generally speaking, Iraq has complied in the period under review with its obligations in respect of the status, privileges and immunities of the Special Commission. However, Iraq has continued to cause difficulties in respect of the Commission's conduct of its own fixed-wing and aerial surveillance flights. Arrangements in regard to the Commission's helicopter operations have been satisfactory since they were commenced, after considerable difficulty, in October 1991.

26. Throughout the period under review, Iraq has continued to protest vigorously against the Special Commission's aerial surveillance flights, and this matter was reported to the Security Council on a number of occasions. r/

27. The protests from Iraq escalated to the point where, on 10 April 1992, the Executive Chairman transmitted to the President of the Council a letter of 9 April he had received from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of Iraq in New York and the response of 10 April the Executive Chairman had sent to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The letter from the Chargé d'affaires referred to a recent incursion by Iranian aircraft into Iraq and called for a halt of all the Special Commission's aerial surveillance flights "in order to avoid any unfortunate incidents" and made reference to the possibility that the flights might "now endanger the aircraft itself and its pilot". In his letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Executive Chairman expressed the gravest concern at these remarks "which appear to constitute a threat to the security of the Commission's aerial surveillance flights which derive from Security

Council resolution 687 (1991) and which are expressly authorized under Security Council resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991) and in the status agreement between the United Nations and Iraq of 14 May 1991". The Executive Chairman indicated that unless the Special Commission received immediate assurances that the Government of Iraq would take all "the necessary steps to ensure that the Iraqi military forces will not interfere with or threaten the security of the flights, the modalities for these unescorted flights will have to be reviewed".

28. Upon receipt of this correspondence, the Council held consultations on 10 April 1992, after which the President issued a statement on behalf of the Council members, s/ in which it was pointed out that "the surveillance flights are carried out under the authority of Security Council resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 715 (1991)", and the right of the Commission to conduct such flights was reaffirmed. The Council called upon the Government of Iraq to give the assurances on the security and safety of the flights which the Executive Chairman had sought in his letter of 10 April to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and warned of serious consequences if Iraq did not comply with its obligations in this regard.

29. On 12 April, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council, t/ in which he said that the sole purpose of the Chargé d'affaires' letter of 9 April had been to draw attention to the dangers to which surveillance flights might "be exposed by reason of the recent hostile action of the Iranian Air Force in Iraqi airspace and the Iraqi defensive counter-action". He affirmed that the Government of Iraq "did not intend and does not intend to carry out any military operation aimed at" the Commission's aerial surveillance flights.

30. The other issue which remains unresolved is that of landing rights for the Special Commission's fixed-wing aircraft in the Baghdad area. Up to the present, landing facilities have been made available by the Iraqi authorities for these aircraft at Habbaniyah airfield, 100 kilometres from Baghdad, although two airfields within Baghdad city limits have been returned to operational use (Muthanna and Rasheed).

31. At Habbaniyah, from time to time, Iraq has proposed to introduce control measures which would impinge on the rights of the Special Commission and IAEA to take into and out of Iraq all necessary equipment, materials and other items required for inspections and the analyses of their results. In the face of objections from the Commission, these measures have not been enforced. However, Iraq has required the Commission's aircraft to land at greater and greater distances from the airport ground facilities where immigration and other formalities are carried out. This has become increasingly onerous and time-consuming.

32. Reference to these difficulties were made in the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council of 25 January 1992 u/ and the matter was elaborated upon in the Executive Chairman's special report to the Council of 18 February 1992. v/ In that report, the Executive Chairman recalled that,

under Council resolution 707 (1991), Iraq is required to allow the Commission "to make full use of ... such airfields in Iraq as [it] may determine are most appropriate for the work of the Commission". He further indicated that on 23 January 1992, an official approach on behalf of the Special Commission had been made to the Iraqi authorities, proposing that the Commission's incoming and outgoing flights use Muthanna or Rasheed airfield and that discussions be immediately entered into to make the necessary practical arrangements.

33. Repeated attempts to receive a response from the Iraqi authorities both in the field and at the level of the Executive Chairman, during his special mission to Baghdad in February 1992 and discussions with the Iraqi delegation to the Security Council in March 1992, have so far been unsuccessful. The Security Council has been kept informed on a number of occasions, w/ without the Executive Chairman so far requesting specific Council action. However, on 11 April 1992, the Executive Chairman addressed a letter to the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Iraq recalling the entire history of the matter. In that letter, the Executive Chairman indicated that the Special Commission will have in the near future to make a determination that Rasheed airfield is the most appropriate for the work of the Commission, unless in the interim the Iraqi authorities propose to the Commission an airport in Baghdad which meets the Commission's requirements. Rasheed would permit consolidation of all the Commission's air operations at one location convenient for its offices and accommodation in Baghdad and would obviate the long delays occasioned by the use of Habbaniyah. At Habbaniyah, the distance from Baghdad has been compounded as a source of delay by the resumption of flights by Iraqi military aircraft requiring the Commission to take long detours to reach the airport facilities.

E. Conclusions

34. The conduct of Iraq, as demonstrated above, confirms the invariable experience of the Special Commission that only a resolute and determined attitude by the Commission, backed up by the Security Council, is likely to achieve the necessary cooperation from Iraq in the many areas covered by section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), and by resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991) where this cooperation has yet to be forthcoming. Where the Special Commission has sought to adopt a different approach, for example in respect of landing rights for its fixed-wing aircraft, it has met only with evasion or lack of definite response. The Special Commission's repeated calls for a change in the attitude of Iraq to one of candour, transparency and cooperation at all levels remain largely unanswered. While Iraq has referred on a number of occasions to a new spirit of cooperation, words have not, for the most part, yet been translated into deeds.

Notes

a/ S/22871/Rev.1 and S/22872/Rev.1 and Corr.1.

b/ S/23268, annex, para. 4.

c/ S/23514, annex, sect. B, paras. 15-26.

d/ S/23500.

e/ S/23606, annex.

f/ S/23609.

g/ S/23643, annex.

h/ S/23663.

i/ S/23687.

j/ S/23699.

k/ S/PV.3059 and S/PV.3059 (Resumption 2).

l/ S/23801.

m/ S/23813.

n/ S/24002, annex.

o/ S/23673, annex I.

p/ Ibid., annex III.

q/ List contained in S/23673, annex I, enclosure II, as modified by the Executive Chairman's letter of 4 April 1992 to the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Iraq.

r/ S/23514, annex, sect. B, para. 31; S/23606, para. 9; and S/23687, annex I, para. 17.

s/ S/23803.

t/ S/23806.

u/ S/23514, annex, sect. B, para. 31.

v/ S/23606, annex, paras. 7 and 8.

w/ S/23643, annex, enclosure, para. 23; and S/23687, annex I, para. 17.

Appendix II

Chemical and biological weapons

A. Inspections

1. At the time of the last report, the first joint chemical and biological inspection team (UNSCOM 21) had very recently completed its work and only a preliminary account of the results was available. The inspection concentrated on possible chemical-weapon (CW) or biological weapon (BW) storage sites, such as airfield bunkers and ammunition depots. A total of 15 sites designated by the Commission were subject to very short-notice inspections. In some cases the notification of inspection was handed to the Iraqi hosts only as the site itself was being approached either by road or by air (helicopter), resulting in virtually no-notice inspections. In addition, a visit was made by a sub-team to Al-Muthanna to witness experiments, using the simulant D4, on the destruction of nerve agents by caustic hydrolysis. At only two of the inspected sites were any items of relevance to Security Council resolution 687 (1991) found. At Karbala, a 12-frame bunker appeared to have had an unusual level of security around it; on questioning, the Iraqi hosts admitted that it had been used for the storage of bulk mustard agent in 1984-1985 but there were no indications that this or any other agents were present when this bunker was destroyed by coalition bombing. Also at Karbala three undeclared, apparently discarded, SCUD triple-frame missile carriers were discovered and reported to the ballistic missile team. Although Iraqi officials stated that four of the buildings at this site had been used for the storage of SCUD missiles during the conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq, there was no evidence of the recent storage of such missiles. At the Mosul Sugar Factory, almost 100 items of metal working machinery from the bomb workshop and general workshop at Muthanna were discovered. This machinery had been used for the manufacture of 250- and 500-gauge bombs. These items were marked and catalogued and the Iraqi officials were requested in writing to return all the items to Muthanna.

2. The seventh CW inspection (UNSCOM 26), which was in Iraq from 27 January to 5 February 1992, inspected 10 sites which had either been declared by Iraq or were designated for inspection by the Executive Chairman. No evidence was found of activities or items relevant to resolution 687 (1991). The team was also able to verify the return to Al-Muthanna site of the bomb-making equipment from Mosul and to observe preparations for and completion of one experimental test run of nerve agent hydrolysis at the pilot plant. Changes to the experimental conditions and procedures were required by the team, largely on safety grounds, but also including technical aspects. The team concluded after the test run that further test runs would be required to establish and prove satisfactory operating conditions and procedures.

3. The eighth chemical inspection team (UNSCOM 35) visited 14 sites over the period 15 to 29 April 1992 to verify, to the extent now practicable, Iraq's declarations, handed to the Chief Inspector of UNSCOM 31 on 28 March 1992, relating to CW items unilaterally destroyed by Iraq during July 1991.

/...

Additionally, the team carried out a no-notice inspection of a suspected documentation centre. The team also visited the previous headquarters of the Centre for Technical Research. No activity of relevance to Security Council resolution 687 (1991) was seen at either site.

B. Destruction activities

4. The destruction of Iraq's chemical agents and filled chemical munitions will certainly be a complex, difficult, time-consuming and potentially hazardous task; arguably it is the most difficult task facing the Special Commission, involving health, safety and environmental aspects in addition to varied technical problems. The planning and preparation for these activities, in New York and in Iraq, continues; destruction of some filled chemical munitions has already been carried out.

5. During the inspections carried out by UNSCOM 20 during October-November 1991, the team concluded that the 122-millimetre rockets at the Khamisiyah site were too unsafe to be moved to Al-Muthanna for destruction there. It was therefore decided that these rockets should be destroyed on site at Khamisiyah. Discussions on the optimum method of destruction involved the Destruction Advisory Panel and the CBW Working Group of the Special Commission. Taking all factors into consideration, it was decided that the rockets were best destroyed by the use of explosive charges to destroy the rocket motors and open the warheads at the same time and to thermally destroy the released agents and degradation products in a fuel fire ignited at the same time the explosive charges were detonated. A team (UNSCOM 29) over the period 21 February to 24 March 1992 directed, controlled and observed the whole operation and provided specialist technical skills and equipment (explosive ordnance destruction expertise, decontamination and medical cover, atmospheric sampling, agent monitoring equipment, etc.) as necessary. Owing to a combination of technical problems, the work experienced initial delays; in addition more rockets were present than expected and further rockets were discovered, buried on the site, some of which were recovered and destroyed during the operation. These set-backs required the team to stay at Khamisiyah for an additional two weeks. The initial problems were overcome and the team was able to start destroying the rockets. In this way, a total of 463 rockets (389 filled, 36 partially filled and 38 unfilled) were destroyed, approximating to 2.5 tonnes of agent (a GB/GF mixture). Safety and environmental concerns were of paramount importance throughout, and the Special Commission's requirements were strictly observed. A system for atmospheric monitoring was established as two linear arrays, at 200 metres and 1,800 metres, downwind of the destruction area. No evidence was obtained for any significant atmospheric contamination by the nerve agent.

6. Preparations for the destruction of CW agents at Muthanna have been actively continued and a team (UNSCOM 32) was in Iraq over the period 5 to 13 April 1992 to assess progress and to provide expert technical guidance.

(a) Mustard agent incinerator. Considerable progress has been made with the construction of this facility and the team estimated that the work is approximately 70 per cent complete. The major elements were in place but further work, including modifications required by the team, were required before commissioning can be considered. Given completion of this work to the standard required, the team saw no reason why the incinerator could not be made to work in a safe, effective and environmentally acceptable manner.

(b) Nerve agent hydrolysis. The experimental work on nerve agent hydrolysis carried out to date, together with the four experiments directed and observed by the team, has demonstrated the feasibility of the process. Consistent achievement of the destruction limits set by the Special Commission has yet to be convincingly demonstrated owing to the need to check the analytical procedures. Further experimental runs will be required to fully define operating parameters once the effectiveness of the analytical procedures, based on gas liquid chromatography, has been proven. The construction of the large-scale nerve agent hydrolysis plant has progressed well but further work and modifications requested by the team as a result of their inspection are required. Given completion of all outstanding work to the required standard, and satisfactory definition of the operating parameters as a result of the experimental programme at the pilot plant, the team saw no reason why the large-scale nerve agent destruction facility could not function safely, effectively and in an environmentally acceptable manner.

(c) Other tasks. Just prior to UNSCOM 32's departure for Iraq, the Special Commission decided that ballistic-missile-related chemicals (ammonium perchlorate, hexamethylene diisocyanate, tolylene diisocyanate, and aluminum powder - all used in the production of solid rocket propellant) should be transferred from their present locations to the Al-Muthanna site for controlled destruction there. Al-Muthanna is now the site in Iraq where, as far as possible all of the Special Commission's chemical destruction operations will be carried out. UNSCOM 32 was therefore instructed to reconnoitre Al-Muthanna site to select an area or areas where the ballistic-missile chemicals could be safely stored to await destruction there. The team was also instructed to discuss with Iraq possible means of destruction of these chemicals and also safe transport of the chemicals to Muthanna. These objectives were achieved.

A roller mounted cradle to which was fitted a remotely operated electric drill had been developed by Iraq for the remote drilling of potentially hazardous 155-millimetre shells. The team inspected this and agreed that it would be safe and effective but would be time- and labour-intensive. Drilling and draining of filled munitions was very likely to represent the rate-determining step in the destruction of Iraq's chemical agents.

Advantage was also taken of the presence of UNSCOM 32 at Muthanna to discuss provision of facilities required by the UNSCOM team which will need to be permanently available at Muthanna during the CW destruction operation; a suitable building was identified for use as an operations room, offices, medical room and other facilities.

Appendix III

Ballistic missiles

1. During the period from December 1991 to June 1992, the United Nations Special Commission conducted a further six ballistic missile inspections in Iraq.

2. There have continued to be doubts about initial Iraqi ballistic missile declarations. In particular, there were questions about the numbers provided by Iraq concerning how many Scud and Scud-variant missiles were used in the war between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq and for other purposes. Iraqi declarations of 19 March 1992 and subsequently confirmed that the Special Commission's suspicions were well-founded; 89 Scud-type missiles were claimed by Iraq to have been destroyed unilaterally and buried in the summer of 1991. Iraqi authorities modified earlier declarations by, inter alia, reducing by 67 the number they previously asserted had been used in the war with the Islamic Republic of Iran. In the light of this and of Iraq's unwillingness to provide evidence which confirms their latest declarations on the past disposition of its ballistic missiles, the Commission continues to harbour justifiable doubts. It is thus not clear that the latest declarations constitute transparency, cooperation and candour.

3. The Commission is now engaged in studying the 5 June report by Iraq and will strive to arrive early at an assessment of the comprehensiveness of the report. Additional inspections and destruction at declared and undeclared sites are required to fulfil the Commission's responsibility to ensure that all ballistic missiles with a range in excess of 150 kilometres, related major parts, and repair and production facilities have been located and destroyed.

4. UNSCOM 23 was conducted from 1 to 9 December 1991 to verify the destruction of fixed launch sites primarily in the Western Zone and the destruction of "supergun" components. A number of undeclared potential missile sites particularly in the production area were also designated for inspection. The team inspected a total of 17 different locations, of which 7 were undeclared sites. Reconstruction at some sites was fairly advanced. In addition, two sites to which production equipment had been evacuated from a production facility were also visited. At two undeclared sites, equipment assessed by the team to have been primarily intended for use in ballistic missile production and testing was found. Iraqi officials were instructed not to remove this equipment pending further instructions from UNSCOM. Four Scud-missile transporters were inspected once again; two of them had been welded and fitted with a non-prohibited short-range missile cradle. Destruction was required for all these transporters; Iraq agreed to destroy them and proposed to blow up the four similar ones remaining at Al-Taji.

5. UNSCOM 24 was conducted from 9 to 17 December 1991 to inspect a number of suspected ballistic missile sites for documentary evidence relating to missiles and equipment and for suspected missile concealment locations. The team inspected 14 different locations; 1 site was in Baghdad, the remainder were in the Western Zone. The team employed a combination of ground and air transportation to accomplish its task of inspecting 13 undeclared sites and 1 declared site. All inspections were conducted on a short-notice basis with site declaration given either upon arrival at the site, or 30 to 40 minutes before arrival at the site. The team was organized in two elements, tailored to tasks and skills. A document search group was composed for those sites designated for document search.

6. UNSCOM 28 was conducted from 21 to 28 February 1992 to supervise destruction by Iraq of missile repair and production facilities and related equipment which were identified to Iraq in a letter dated 14 February 1992. In addition, all prohibited items discovered were to be catalogued and their exact locations recorded. The team inspected a total of seven different locations. The ballistic missile production and repair facilities for the missile solid propellant project were visited and the team observed that all of them had been extensively rebuilt. A number of areas which were inaccessible to previous inspection teams owing to war damage were visited and prohibited items were catalogued. However, the Iraqi authorities refused to comply with instructions to destroy the missile production and repair equipment as required in the Executive Chairman's letter of 14 February 1992 to the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. No items were destroyed but they were recatalogued for a future destruction mission. When it became apparent that the Iraqi authorities would not permit destruction to occur, the Executive Chairman ordered the team to halt its activities and withdraw from Iraq, which it did.

7. UNSCOM 31 was conducted from 21 to 30 March 1992 to verify Iraq's claim to have unilaterally destroyed 89 ballistic missiles during the summer of 1991 along with certain associated equipment, to initiate the destruction of Iraq's ballistic missile production and repair equipment and to carry out a number of undeclared inspections. The team supervised the destruction of some of the missile production equipment that UNSCOM 28/BM8 had not been able to destroy. Among papers given to the Chief Inspector was a revised accounting of the number of missiles Iraq claims to have received from the former Soviet Union, and the uses to which they had been put; in particular, the list revises downward the number of missiles fired against the Islamic Republic of Iran between 1980 and 1988.

8. UNSCOM 34 was conducted from 13 to 21 April 1992 to resume the activities of UNSCOM 28, i.e. the supervision of the destruction by Iraq of facilities and equipment associated with Iraq's ballistic missile production programme. The team supervised the destruction of 45 such items of production equipment and 10 buildings, that is, the majority of the items on List A of the Executive Chairman's letter of 14 February 1992 as extended by his letter of 4 April 1992, both to the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, and continued with the verification of the Iraqi declaration of 19 March 1992.

9. UNSCOM 36, conducted from 14 to 22 May 1992, further continued this process. The team inventoried equipment designed for the production of nozzles for the BADR-2000. All items declared were verified as destroyed, including a second mock-up of the BADR-2000 ballistic missile, miscellaneous components, and missile transport dollies. The team additionally verified the destruction of two horizontal test vehicles, two independent test vehicles, two independent training test vehicles, and one missile maintenance vehicle, the erector arm of the training launcher, nine oxidizer and four propellant vehicles, a spot welder and a rolling machine. UNSCOM 36 identified five sets of Iraqi manufactured missile guidance components which the team had been directed to remove from Iraq for technical analysis. Additional guidance component parts were found; these had been destroyed unilaterally by Iraq and the remains scattered in and around a 10-kilometre stretch of a canal. The team inspected remains of previously destroyed "TONKA" fuel starter systems. Finally, UNSCOM 36 found a number of the documents relating to the construction of facilities associated with, or suspected of being associated with, missile systems. After some discussion, the team removed for further analysis copies of 33 pages of documents concerning construction at Sa'ad 16.

Appendix IV

Special Commission inspection schedule

Nuclear

15 May-21 May 1991	IAEA1/UNSCOM1
22 June-3 July 1991	IAEA2/UNSCOM4
7 July-18 July 1991	IAEA3/UNSCOM5
27 July-10 August 1991	IAEA4/UNSCOM6
14 September-20 September 1991	IAEA5/UNSCOM14
21 September-30 September 1991	IAEA6/UNSCOM16
11 October-22 October 1991	IAEA7/UNSCOM19
11 November-18 November 1991	IAEA8/UNSCOM22
11 January-14 January 1992	IAEA9/UNSCOM25
5 February-13 February 1992	IAEA10/UNSCOM27+30
7 April-15 April 1992	IAEA11/UNSCOM33
26 May-5 June 1992	IAEA12/UNSCOM37

Chemical

9 June-15 June 1991	CW1/UNSCOM2
15 August-22 August 1991	CW2/UNSCOM9
31 August-8 September 1991	CW3/UNSCOM11
31 August-5 September 1991	CW4/UNSCOM12
6 October-9 November 1991	CW5/UNSCOM17
22 October-2 November 1991	CW6/UNSCOM20
18 November-1 December 1991	CBW/UNSCOM21
27 January-5 February 1992	CW7/UNSCOM26
15 April-29 April 1992	CW8/UNSCOM35
21 February-24 March 1992	CD1/UNSCOM29
5 April-13 April 1992	CD2/UNSCOM32

Biological

2 August-8 August 1991	BW1/UNSCOM7
20 September-3 October 1991	BW2/UNSCOM15

Ballistic missiles

30 June-7 July 1991	BM1/UNSCOM3
18 July-20 July 1991	BM2/UNSCOM10
8 August-15 August 1991	BM3/UNSCOM8
6 September-13 September 1991	BM4/UNSCOM13
1 October-9 October 1991	BM5/UNSCOM18
1 December-9 December 1991	BM6/UNSCOM23
9 December-17 December 1991	BM7/UNSCOM24
21 February-29 February 1992	BM8/UNSCOM28
21 March-29 March 1992	BM9/UNSCOM31
13 April-21 April 1992	BM10/UNSCOM34
14 May-22 May 1992	BM11/UNSCOM36

Special missions

30 June-3 July 1991
11 August-14 August 1991
4 October-6 October 1991
11 November-15 November 1991
27 January-30 January 1992
21 February-24 February 1992

Appendix V

Establishment and mandate

1. Establishment and composition

1. The establishment, organization and mandate of the Special Commission remains essentially as described in the first report of the Special Commission. a/ Changes in the composition are recorded in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the present report.

2. Organization

2. The Office of the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission continues to discharge its responsibilities for operations support, with the assistance of the Field Offices in Bahrain and Baghdad. The number of regular United Nations staff assigned to the Special Commission or specifically recruited for service with it total 45: 14 Professionals and 31 General Service. Staff made available by Governments to serve in the three offices number 14.

3. As the amount of information available to the Special Commission has continued to increase rapidly, it became obvious during the period under review that a capability to manage it more effectively was required. An Information Assessment Unit has thus been established in the Executive Office of the Special Commission. This Unit commenced its operations in early January 1992. The principal functions of the Unit include the systematic, computer-assisted storage, retrieval and assessment of information pertaining to the Commission's mandate. Other key functions are assisting in the planning and execution of inspections in Iraq, and the direction, on behalf of the Executive Chairman, of aerial surveillance flights over Iraq. The primary sources of information for the Information Assessment Unit include: reports of Commission inspection teams, results of aerial surveillance flights, information provided by States, and information from public media. Iraqi declarations required by Security Council resolutions, when they come to constitute full, final and complete disclosure, will also be an important source of information to the Commission. It is expected that the Information Assessment Unit will play an increasingly important role in the operations of the Commission, particularly in ongoing monitoring and verification.

3. Mandate

4. The mandate of the Special Commission remains unchanged, although further progress has been made in the preparations for the introduction of ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with relevant parts of section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991). It has not proved possible to initiate such ongoing monitoring and verification in the period under review, given Iraq's failure to acknowledge its obligations under

Council resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991) and under the Commission's and IAEA's plans for such monitoring approved by resolution 715 (1991). b/ Furthermore, the declarations by Iraq required under the plans will be needed before ongoing monitoring and verification can commence. (See appendix I for details.)

Notes

a/ S/23165, annex.

b/ S/22871/Rev.1 and S/22872/Rev.1 and Corr.1.

Appendix VI

Contributions to the Special Commission

1. The following contributions in cash and in kind (i.e., in addition to materials and equipment provided by Governments to individual inspectors) have been received to date:

(a) In cash paid into United Nations accounts

Government	Amount (United States dollars)	Remarks
Japan	1 000 000	From a trust fund
Kuwait	1 000 000	
Saudi Arabia	1 730 000	
United Kingdom	170 000	
United States of America	14 000 000	

The United Nations provided support out of the Working Capital Fund for the first five months of operation to a total of $8 million.

(b) Outright grant

Australia	Individual chemical protective equipment
France	Individual chemical protective equipment
Norway	15 vehicles 5 satellite global positioning system units 2 ambulances
United Kingdom	600 tins decontamination agent XLIEI
United States of America	7 vehicles 4 trucks 2 ambulances

(c) Loaned for the duration of the operation

France	3 chemical agent detectors (AP2C)
New Zealand	Medical equipment

Sweden	Decontamination equipment Individual chemical protective equipment
United Kingdom	Individual chemical protective equipment 2 biological weapons agent detection kits 24 chemical weapons agent vapour monitors 1 chemical remote agent detection unit

(d) Loaned and returned

Belgium	Medical equipment
Canada	Global positioning system Remote chemical detection equipment
Finland	2 gas chromatographs
France	Medical equipment
Germany	Explosive ordnance equipment
Netherlands	Chemical weapons analysis equipment
Switzerland	Chemical detection equipment Protective clothing
United Kingdom	5 vehicles Laboratory equipment, including a gas chromatograph mass spectrometer and an infrared spectrophotometer Portable generators

Personnel

2. In addition to personnel assigned from the United Nations, IAEA and the World Health Organization, the following Governments have provided personnel for the Commission's activities: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Romania, Russian Federation, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

3. To date, New Zealand has provided full medical support consisting of a core team of five personnel, augmented as necessary by additional doctors and medical assistants for particularly hazardous inspections or special projects.

4. Several Governments have responded positively to the Commission's request for personnel to be seconded to the chemical destruction programme at Al-Muthanna. The Commission will report on these contributions once the programme is under way.

Air support

5. The Commission has been provided with high-altitude reconnaissance flights over Iraq. The flights are undertaken on a regular basis by an aircraft with crew and support personnel made available to the Commission by the United States. Flights are directed by the Special Commission and the aircraft bear United Nations insignia. They are notified to Iraq 72 hours in advance and acknowledged by Iraq within 48 hours.

6. The Government of Germany has provided full air transport and support for the Commission's ground activities. Two C-160 Transall aircraft, based in Bahrain, transport inspectors and United Nations Special Commission personnel and cargo to and from Baghdad. Thirteen crew and support personnel operate the aircraft. Three CH-53 rotary-wing aircraft, including 28 crew and support personnel, are based at the Al-Rasheed airfield in Baghdad. They ferry teams to and carry out surveillance flights in relation to inspection sites, and act as the primary means of emergency medical evacuation of United Nations Special Commission personnel. They have also provided emergency medical services, on an ad hoc basis, to other United Nations personnel in Iraq.

Facilities

7. The Government of Bahrain generously provides facilities for the Bahrain Field Office at Manama airfield. In addition, it has made available facilities which enabled personnel from the Special Commission to install and use analytical equipment specifically required by one of its chemical inspection teams.

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NOTE VERBALE DATED 16 JUNE 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF BURKINA FASO TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The Permanent Mission of Burkina Faso to the United Nations presents its compliments to the President of the Security Council and has the honour to transmit the following note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Burkina Faso:

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Burkina Faso presents its compliments to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia and, with reference to the note dated 1 June 1992, has the honour to inform him that Burkina Faso maintains no relations with Somalia that entail the delivery of weapons or military supplies or equipment of any kind.

"Burkina Faso is not in possession of any information concerning violations of the arms embargo with respect to Somalia.

"The Government of Burkina Faso, which supports the efforts of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of the Islamic Conference to restore peace and stability in Somalia, will adhere to this policy in order to meet its obligations under the terms of paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992."

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NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Security Council, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 699 (1991), the attached second semi-annual report on the implementation by the IAEA of the plan for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of items listed in paragraph 12 of United Nations Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

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Annex

Second semi-annual report (covering the period 17 December 1991 - 17 June 1992) on the implementation by the IAEA of the plan for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of items listed in paragraph 12 of UN Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

Introduction

By resolution 699 of 17 June 1991, the Security Council approved the plan submitted by the IAEA through the Secretary-General for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of all items listed in paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 687. Resolution 699 also called for the Secretary-General to submit every six months a progress report on the implementation of the plan.

The first of these reports was circulated by the Secretary-General to the members of the Security Council in document S/23295 dated 17 December 1991. The Secretary-General also circulated on 29 May 1992 a report (S/24036) submitted by the Director General of the IAEA on the status of Iraq's compliance with its obligations under Security Council resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 705 (1991). In this report, the Director General provided information related to destruction activities carried out in Iraq during the 11th inspection mission.

This is the second semi-annual report on the implementation by the IAEA of the plan for destruction, removal or rendering harmless covering the period from 17 December 1991 to 17 June 1992. Its content has been structured in such a way as to facilitate comparison with the previous report and evaluation of progress.

Present situation

Direct-Use Material

Fresh fuel

After the removal of all the fresh fuel for the IRT 5000 reactor, which was accomplished in November 1991, in conjunction with the 8th IAEA inspection, the 12.24 kg of U235 contained in the fuel was processed in a Russian facility and transformed through isotopic dilution into approximately 61 kg of uranium enriched to slightly less than 20% in U235. Once the product specifications have been verified by the Agency, this material will be transferred from the processing plant to an agreed facility for storage in Russia. Agency safeguards will continue to be applied during storage.

The French-origin MTR type plates containing a total of 372 grams of U235, and the Russian-origin pins, containing a total of 116.1 grams of U235, were removed from Iraq in June 1992 by the inspectors of the 12th team and are now temporarily stored at laboratory of the IAEA in Seibersdorf, Austria.

Irradiated fuel

As referred to in the first report (S/23295), other irradiated enriched research reactor fuel containing a total of 35.58 kg of U235 is held in storage in two locations, one within Tuwaitha in the Russian reactor building, the second, at a site identified as Location B, a few kilometers north of Tuwaitha in farm land area.

Inadequate storage conditions at Location B led to serious corrosion problems. New containers were brought to this site and filled with demineralized water, into which all of the fuel elements in Location B were transferred with the exception of 6 control rods. The situation is now stable and the corrosion rate should decrease.

Negotiations with the consortium of commercial companies from France and the UK for the removal and reprocessing of this fuel have met with difficulties of a legal, technical and and financial nature. Efforts are being made to overcome these difficulties.

Plutonium and Other Nuclear Material

There is nothing further to report on plutonium. As to other nuclear material, the material balance is still not satisfactory. The IAEA is continuing efforts to reconcile discrepancies in the declarations.

Installations, equipment and other materials relevant to enriched uranium production

Information received from Governments of other States and, in particular, from the Government of Germany about the procurement by Iraq of large quantities of special materials and components needed in the manufacturing of gas centrifuges for the production of enriched uranium, was used in the course of the 9th IAEA inspection mission. The Iraqi authorities acknowledged the procurement of these materials and components, but stated that all of them had been destroyed or "rendered harmless" before the start of inspection activities under UN Security Council resolution 687 (1991). In the course of the same mission, the Iraqi side acknowledged the procurement of additional special material and components not included in the information previously received by the Agency from Iraq or others States. The Iraqi authorities stated that destruction of these materials and components had also

occurred prior to commencement of the inspection activities. A detailed description of the material and components in question is contained in document S/23505. The extent and effectiveness of the destruction carried out by the Iraqi authorities of these items is now under assessment by the Agency. Additional measures will be necessary, in some cases, to rule out any possibility of recovery.

The destruction of components specific to the Electromagnetic Isotope Separation (EMIS) program, begun in the previous six month reporting period, continues. The destruction activities have included the removal to a nearby storage area of 51 return irons (30 tons each) from the alpha calutron pier at Tarmiya.

A plan for the dismantling of EMIS uranium enrichment production capabilities at the Tarmiya and Ash Sharqat sites was prepared and communicated to the Iraqi side on 15 May 1992. The plan included reduction of the electrical power delivery to both sites, removal of general utilities from buildings and destruction of eight key technical buildings. Implementation of this plan was begun, with full co-operation of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission, in the course of the 12th IAEA inspection (26 May - 4 June 1992) and is presently more than 50% complete. Dismantling operations at Tarmiya and Ash Sharqat will be completed by the time of the next inspection, scheduled to take place in July 1992, in the course of which the destruction of relevant buildings at these sites will also be completed.

Installations and equipment relevant to the weaponization activities

On 25 March 1992, following a series of meetings in Vienna between IAEA officials and an Iraqi technical delegation, a formal communication containing a list of buildings and equipment to be destroyed at the Al Atheer-Al Hatteen site was transmitted to the Iraqi authorities. The Al Atheer-Al Hatteen site had been identified by the IAEA as the main research centre where the IAEC intended to pursue its program for developing nuclear weapons. Eight buildings covering a surface of approximately 35 000 square meters, and 26 major equipment items, some consisting of several components, were destroyed under the supervision of Agency inspectors in the course of the 11th and 12th IAEA inspection missions. In the case of one additional item on the equipment list, essential components were removed to IAEA, Vienna.

The techniques employed for destruction included the use of explosive charges. A total of more than 6 tons of explosives were used. The large bunker at the Al Hatteen site was filled with concrete and scrap iron to prevent its further use (350 cubic meters of concrete were poured), as the use of explosives in this case was judged to be impractical. The bunker's high protective berm was levelled. Cutting torches were used to destroy the steel liner shell

of the internal explosion test chamber and to cut off reinforcing bars of the internal explosive test chamber and of the contained firing facility that was part of the physics building. The Iraqi side provided all the equipment, materials and manpower necessary for fulfilling the destruction plan under the supervision of the IAEA teams. Details of the buildings and equipment destroyed at the Al Atheer-Al Hatteen site are given in the inspection reports of IAEA-11 (doc S/23947) and IAEA-12 (in preparation).

Future Activities

The removal from Iraq of the remaining 35 kilograms of U235 contained in the irradiated fuel elements of the Tamuz 2 and IRT 5000 research reactors is one of the major tasks still pending. It is hoped that negotiations with the contractors can be brought to a successful conclusion and that the financial resources necessary for removal and processing of the irradiated fuel will be found.

The destruction of key buildings and installations at Tarmiya and Ash Sharqat will be completed in the course of the next IAEA inspection in Iraq. Once this operation is finished, Tarmiya, Ash Sharqat, Tuwaitha and Al Atheer-Al Hatteen will not be equipped for undertaking activities proscribed under United Nations Security Council resolution 687 (1991). The verification of compliance by Iraq with the requirements of the resolution at these sites will rest on the IAEA plan for future ongoing monitoring and verification.

Additional destruction, removal or rendering harmless may be necessary in the near term pending the result of ongoing sample analysis. In the long-term, as provided for in paragraph 31 of the IAEA plan for future ongoing monitoring and verification, the inspection of any sites designated by the Special Commission or the IAEA in the course of implementation of that Plan may also give rise to the need for destruction, removal or rendering harmless not foreseen at this time.

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Forty-seventh session
Item 10 of the preliminary list*
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON
THE WORK OF THE ORGANIZATION

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-seventh year

AN AGENDA FOR PEACE

Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping

Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992

INTRODUCTION

1. In its statement of 31 January 1992, adopted at the conclusion of the first meeting held by the Security Council at the level of Heads of State and Government, I was invited to prepare, for circulation to the Members of the United Nations by 1 July 1992, an "analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping." 1/

2. The United Nations is a gathering of sovereign States and what it can do depends on the common ground that they create between them. The adversarial decades of the cold war made the original promise of the Organization impossible to fulfil. The January 1992 Summit therefore represented an unprecedented recommitment, at the highest political level, to the Purposes and Principles of the Charter.

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* A/47/50.

3. In these past months a conviction has grown, among nations large and small, that an opportunity has been regained to achieve the great objectives of the Charter - a United Nations capable of maintaining international peace and security, of securing justice and human rights and of promoting, in the words of the Charter, "social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom". This opportunity must not be squandered. The Organization must never again be crippled as it was in the era that has now passed.

4. I welcome the invitation of the Security Council, early in my tenure as Secretary-General, to prepare this report. It draws upon ideas and proposals transmitted to me by Governments, regional agencies, non-governmental organizations, and institutions and individuals from many countries. I am grateful for these, even as I emphasize that the responsibility for this report is my own.

5. The sources of conflict and war are pervasive and deep. To reach them will require our utmost effort to enhance respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, to promote sustainable economic and social development for wider prosperity, to alleviate distress and to curtail the existence and use of massively destructive weapons. The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, the largest summit ever held, has just met at Rio de Janeiro. Next year will see the second World Conference on Human Rights. In 1994 Population and Development will be addressed. In 1995 the World Conference on Women will take place, and a World Summit for Social Development has been proposed. Throughout my term as Secretary-General I shall be addressing all these great issues. I bear them all in mind as, in the present report, I turn to the problems that the Council has specifically requested I consider: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping - to which I have added a closely related concept, post-conflict peace-building.

6. The manifest desire of the membership to work together is a new source of strength in our common endeavour. Success is far from certain, however. While my report deals with ways to improve the Organization's capacity to pursue and preserve peace, it is crucial for all Member States to bear in mind that the search for improved mechanisms and techniques will be of little significance unless this new spirit of commonality is propelled by the will to take the hard decisions demanded by this time of opportunity.

7. It is therefore with a sense of moment, and with gratitude, that I present this report to the Members of the United Nations.

I. THE CHANGING CONTEXT

8. In the course of the past few years the immense ideological barrier that for decades gave rise to distrust and hostility - and the terrible tools of destruction that were their inseparable companions - has collapsed. Even as the issues between States north and south grow more acute, and call for attention at the highest levels of government, the improvement in relations between States east and west affords new possibilities, some already realized, to meet successfully threats to common security.

9. Authoritarian regimes have given way to more democratic forces and responsive Governments. The form, scope and intensity of these processes differ from Latin America to Africa to Europe to Asia, but they are sufficiently similar to indicate a global phenomenon. Parallel to these political changes, many States are seeking more open forms of economic policy, creating a world-wide sense of dynamism and movement.

10. To the hundreds of millions who gained their independence in the surge of decolonization following the creation of the United Nations, have been added millions more who have recently gained freedom. Once again new States are taking their seats in the General Assembly. Their arrival reconfirms the importance and indispensability of the sovereign State as the fundamental entity of the international community.

11. We have entered a time of global transition marked by uniquely contradictory trends. Regional and continental associations of States are evolving ways to deepen cooperation and ease some of the contentious characteristics of sovereign and nationalistic rivalries. National boundaries are blurred by advanced communications and global commerce, and by the decisions of States to yield some sovereign prerogatives to larger, common political associations. At the same time, however, fierce new assertions of nationalism and sovereignty spring up, and the cohesion of States is threatened by brutal ethnic, religious, social, cultural or linguistic strife. Social peace is challenged on the one hand by new assertions of discrimination and exclusion and, on the other, by acts of terrorism seeking to undermine evolution and change through democratic means.

12. The concept of peace is easy to grasp; that of international security is more complex, for a pattern of contradictions has arisen here as well. As major nuclear Powers have begun to negotiate arms reduction agreements, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction threatens to increase and conventional arms continue to be amassed in many parts of the world. As racism becomes recognized for the destructive force it is and as apartheid is being dismantled, new racial tensions are rising and finding expression in violence. Technological advances are altering the nature and the expectation of life all over the globe. The revolution in communications has united the world in awareness, in aspiration and in greater solidarity against injustice. But progress also brings new risks for stability: ecological damage, disruption of family and community life, greater intrusion into the lives and rights of individuals.

13. This new dimension of insecurity must not be allowed to obscure the continuing and devastating problems of unchecked population growth, crushing debt burdens, barriers to trade, drugs and the growing disparity between rich and poor. Poverty, disease, famine, oppression and despair abound, joining to produce 17 million refugees, 20 million displaced persons and massive migrations of peoples within and beyond national borders. These are both sources and consequences of conflict that require the ceaseless attention and the highest priority in the efforts of the United Nations. A porous ozone shield could pose a greater threat to an exposed population than a hostile

army. Drought and disease can decimate no less mercilessly than the weapons of war. So at this moment of renewed opportunity, the efforts of the Organization to build peace, stability and security must encompass matters beyond military threats in order to break the fetters of strife and warfare that have characterized the past. But armed conflicts today, as they have throughout history, continue to bring fear and horror to humanity, requiring our urgent involvement to try to prevent, contain and bring them to an end.

14. Since the creation of the United Nations in 1945, over 100 major conflicts around the world have left some 20 million dead. The United Nations was rendered powerless to deal with many of these crises because of the vetoes - 279 of them - cast in the Security Council, which were a vivid expression of the divisions of that period.

15. With the end of the cold war there have been no such vetoes since 31 May 1990, and demands on the United Nations have surged. Its security arm, once disabled by circumstances it was not created or equipped to control, has emerged as a central instrument for the prevention and resolution of conflicts and for the preservation of peace. Our aims must be:

- To seek to identify at the earliest possible stage situations that could produce conflict, and to try through diplomacy to remove the sources of danger before violence results;

- Where conflict erupts, to engage in peacemaking aimed at resolving the issues that have led to conflict;

- Through peace-keeping, to work to preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers;

- To stand ready to assist in peace-building in its differing contexts: rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; and building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war;

- And in the largest sense, to address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression. It is possible to discern an increasingly common moral perception that spans the world's nations and peoples, and which is finding expression in international laws, many owing their genesis to the work of this Organization.

16. This wider mission for the world Organization will demand the concerted attention and effort of individual States, of regional and non-governmental organizations and of all of the United Nations system, with each of the principal organs functioning in the balance and harmony that the Charter requires. The Security Council has been assigned by all Member States the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter. In its broadest sense this responsibility must be shared

by the General Assembly and by all the functional elements of the world Organization. Each has a special and indispensable role to play in an integrated approach to human security. The Secretary-General's contribution rests on the pattern of trust and cooperation established between him and the deliberative organs of the United Nations.

17. The foundation-stone of this work is and must remain the State. Respect for its fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any common international progress. The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory was never matched by reality. It is the task of leaders of States today to understand this and to find a balance between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world. Commerce, communications and environmental matters transcend administrative borders; but inside those borders is where individuals carry out the first order of their economic, political and social lives. The United Nations has not closed its door. Yet if every ethnic, religious or linguistic group claimed statehood, there would be no limit to fragmentation, and peace, security and economic well-being for all would become ever more difficult to achieve.

18. One requirement for solutions to these problems lies in commitment to human rights with a special sensitivity to those of minorities, whether ethnic, religious, social or linguistic. The League of Nations provided a machinery for the international protection of minorities. The General Assembly soon will have before it a declaration on the rights of minorities. That instrument, together with the increasingly effective machinery of the United Nations dealing with human rights, should enhance the situation of minorities as well as the stability of States.

19. Globalism and nationalism need not be viewed as opposing trends, doomed to spur each other on to extremes of reaction. The healthy globalization of contemporary life requires in the first instance solid identities and fundamental freedoms. The sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of States within the established international system, and the principle of self-determination for peoples, both of great value and importance, must not be permitted to work against each other in the period ahead. Respect for democratic principles at all levels of social existence is crucial: in communities, within States and within the community of States. Our constant duty should be to maintain the integrity of each while finding a balanced design for all.

II. DEFINITIONS

20. The terms preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping are integrally related and as used in this report are defined as follows:

Preventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.

Peacemaking is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.

Peace-keeping is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.

21. The present report in addition will address the critically related concept of post-conflict peace-building - action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. Preventive diplomacy seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks out; peacemaking and peace-keeping are required to halt conflicts and preserve peace once it is attained. If successful, they strengthen the opportunity for post-conflict peace-building, which can prevent the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples.

22. These four areas for action, taken together, and carried out with the backing of all Members, offer a coherent contribution towards securing peace in the spirit of the Charter. The United Nations has extensive experience not only in these fields, but in the wider realm of work for peace in which these four fields are set. Initiatives on decolonization, on the environment and sustainable development, on population, on the eradication of disease, on disarmament and on the growth of international law - these and many others have contributed immeasurably to the foundations for a peaceful world. The world has often been rent by conflict and plagued by massive human suffering and deprivation. Yet it would have been far more so without the continuing efforts of the United Nations. This wide experience must be taken into account in assessing the potential of the United Nations in maintaining international security not only in its traditional sense, but in the new dimensions presented by the era ahead.

III. PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY

23. The most desirable and efficient employment of diplomacy is to ease tensions before they result in conflict - or, if conflict breaks out, to act swiftly to contain it and resolve its underlying causes. Preventive diplomacy may be performed by the Secretary-General personally or through senior staff or specialized agencies and programmes, by the Security Council or the General Assembly, and by regional organizations in cooperation with the United Nations. Preventive diplomacy requires measures to create confidence; it needs early warning based on information gathering and informal or formal fact-finding; it may also involve preventive deployment and, in some situations, demilitarized zones.

Measures to build confidence

24. Mutual confidence and good faith are essential to reducing the likelihood of conflict between States. Many such measures are available to Governments that have the will to employ them. Systematic exchange of military missions, formation of regional or subregional risk reduction centres, arrangements for the free flow of information, including the monitoring of regional arms agreements, are examples. I ask all regional organizations to consider what further confidence-building measures might be applied in their areas and to inform the United Nations of the results. I will undertake periodic consultations on confidence-building measures with parties to potential, current or past disputes and with regional organizations, offering such advisory assistance as the Secretariat can provide.

Fact-finding

25. Preventive steps must be based upon timely and accurate knowledge of the facts. Beyond this, an understanding of developments and global trends, based on sound analysis, is required. And the willingness to take appropriate preventive action is essential. Given the economic and social roots of many potential conflicts, the information needed by the United Nations now must encompass economic and social trends as well as political developments that may lead to dangerous tensions.

(a) An increased resort to fact-finding is needed, in accordance with the Charter, initiated either by the Secretary-General, to enable him to meet his responsibilities under the Charter, including Article 99, or by the Security Council or the General Assembly. Various forms may be employed selectively as the situation requires. A request by a State for the sending of a United Nations fact-finding mission to its territory should be considered without undue delay.

(b) Contacts with the Governments of Member States can provide the Secretary-General with detailed information on issues of concern. I ask that all Member States be ready to provide the information needed for effective preventive diplomacy. I will supplement my own contacts by regularly sending senior officials on missions for consultations in capitals or other locations. Such contacts are essential to gain insight into a situation and to assess its potential ramifications.

(c) Formal fact-finding can be mandated by the Security Council or by the General Assembly, either of which may elect to send a mission under its immediate authority or may invite the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, including the designation of a special envoy. In addition to collecting information on which a decision for further action can be taken, such a mission can in some instances help to defuse a dispute by its presence, indicating to the parties that the Organization, and in particular the Security Council, is actively seized of the matter as a present or potential threat to international security.

(d) In exceptional circumstances the Council may meet away from Headquarters as the Charter provides, in order not only to inform itself directly, but also to bring the authority of the Organization to bear on a given situation.

Early warning

26. In recent years the United Nations system has been developing a valuable network of early warning systems concerning environmental threats, the risk of nuclear accident, natural disasters, mass movements of populations, the threat of famine and the spread of disease. There is a need, however, to strengthen arrangements in such a manner that information from these sources can be synthesized with political indicators to assess whether a threat to peace exists and to analyse what action might be taken by the United Nations to alleviate it. This is a process that will continue to require the close cooperation of the various specialized agencies and functional offices of the United Nations. The analyses and recommendations for preventive action that emerge will be made available by me, as appropriate, to the Security Council and other United Nations organs. I recommend in addition that the Security Council invite a reinvigorated and restructured Economic and Social Council to provide reports, in accordance with Article 65 of the Charter, on those economic and social developments that may, unless mitigated, threaten international peace and security.

27. Regional arrangements and organizations have an important role in early warning. I ask regional organizations that have not yet sought observer status at the United Nations to do so and to be linked, through appropriate arrangements, with the security mechanisms of this Organization.

Preventive deployment

28. United Nations operations in areas of crisis have generally been established after conflict has occurred. The time has come to plan for circumstances warranting preventive deployment, which could take place in a variety of instances and ways. For example, in conditions of national crisis there could be preventive deployment at the request of the Government or all parties concerned, or with their consent; in inter-State disputes such deployment could take place when two countries feel that a United Nations presence on both sides of their border can discourage hostilities; furthermore, preventive deployment could take place when a country feels threatened and requests the deployment of an appropriate United Nations presence along its side of the border alone. In each situation, the mandate and composition of the United Nations presence would need to be carefully devised and be clear to all.

29. In conditions of crisis within a country, when the Government requests or all parties consent, preventive deployment could help in a number of ways to alleviate suffering and to limit or control violence. Humanitarian assistance, impartially provided, could be of critical importance; assistance in maintaining security, whether through military, police or civilian

personnel, could save lives and develop conditions of safety in which negotiations can be held; the United Nations could also help in conciliation efforts if this should be the wish of the parties. In certain circumstances, the United Nations may well need to draw upon the specialized skills and resources of various parts of the United Nations system; such operations may also on occasion require the participation of non-governmental organizations.

30. In these situations of internal crisis the United Nations will need to respect the sovereignty of the State; to do otherwise would not be in accordance with the understanding of Member States in accepting the principles of the Charter. The Organization must remain mindful of the carefully negotiated balance of the guiding principles annexed to General Assembly resolution 46/182 of 19 December 1991. Those guidelines stressed, inter alia, that humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality; that the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of States must be fully respected in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; and that, in this context, humanitarian assistance should be provided with the consent of the affected country and, in principle, on the basis of an appeal by that country. The guidelines also stressed the responsibility of States to take care of the victims of emergencies occurring on their territory and the need for access to those requiring humanitarian assistance. In the light of these guidelines, a Government's request for United Nations involvement, or consent to it, would not be an infringement of that State's sovereignty or be contrary to Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter which refers to matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State.

31. In inter-State disputes, when both parties agree, I recommend that if the Security Council concludes that the likelihood of hostilities between neighbouring countries could be removed by the preventive deployment of a United Nations presence on the territory of each State, such action should be taken. The nature of the tasks to be performed would determine the composition of the United Nations presence.

32. In cases where one nation fears a cross-border attack, if the Security Council concludes that a United Nations presence on one side of the border, with the consent only of the requesting country, would serve to deter conflict, I recommend that preventive deployment take place. Here again, the specific nature of the situation would determine the mandate and the personnel required to fulfil it.

Demilitarized zones

33. In the past, demilitarized zones have been established by agreement of the parties at the conclusion of a conflict. In addition to the deployment of United Nations personnel in such zones as part of peace-keeping operations, consideration should now be given to the usefulness of such zones as a form of preventive deployment, on both sides of a border, with the agreement of the two parties, as a means of separating potential belligerents, or on one side

of the line, at the request of one party, for the purpose of removing any pretext for attack. Demilitarized zones would serve as symbols of the international community's concern that conflict be prevented.

IV. PEACEMAKING

34. Between the tasks of seeking to prevent conflict and keeping the peace lies the responsibility to try to bring hostile parties to agreement by peaceful means. Chapter VI of the Charter sets forth a comprehensive list of such means for the resolution of conflict. These have been amplified in various declarations adopted by the General Assembly, including the Manila Declaration of 1982 on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes 2/ and the 1988 Declaration on the Prevention and Removal of Disputes and Situations Which May Threaten International Peace and Security and on the Role of the United Nations in this Field. 3/ They have also been the subject of various resolutions of the General Assembly, including resolution 44/21 of 15 November 1989 on enhancing international peace, security and international cooperation in all its aspects in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. The United Nations has had wide experience in the application of these peaceful means. If conflicts have gone unresolved, it is not because techniques for peaceful settlement were unknown or inadequate. The fault lies first in the lack of political will of parties to seek a solution to their differences through such means as are suggested in Chapter VI of the Charter, and second, in the lack of leverage at the disposal of a third party if this is the procedure chosen. The indifference of the international community to a problem, or the marginalization of it, can also thwart the possibilities of solution. We must look primarily to these areas if we hope to enhance the capacity of the Organization for achieving peaceful settlements.

35. The present determination in the Security Council to resolve international disputes in the manner foreseen in the Charter has opened the way for a more active Council role. With greater unity has come leverage and persuasive power to lead hostile parties towards negotiations. I urge the Council to take full advantage of the provisions of the Charter under which it may recommend appropriate procedures or methods for dispute settlement and, if all the parties to a dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties for a pacific settlement of the dispute.

36. The General Assembly, like the Security Council and the Secretary-General, also has an important role assigned to it under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. As a universal forum, its capacity to consider and recommend appropriate action must be recognized. To that end it is essential to promote its utilization by all Member States so as to bring greater influence to bear in pre-empting or containing situations which are likely to threaten international peace and security.

37. Mediation and negotiation can be undertaken by an individual designated by the Security Council, by the General Assembly or by the Secretary-General. There is a long history of the utilization by the United Nations of distinguished statesmen to facilitate the processes of peace. They can bring a personal prestige that, in addition to their experience, can encourage the parties to enter serious negotiations. There is a wide willingness to serve in this capacity, from which I shall continue to benefit as the need arises. Frequently it is the Secretary-General himself who undertakes the task. While the mediator's effectiveness is enhanced by strong and evident support from the Council, the General Assembly and the relevant Member States acting in their national capacity, the good offices of the Secretary-General may at times be employed most effectively when conducted independently of the deliberative bodies. Close and continuous consultation between the Secretary-General and the Security Council is, however, essential to ensure full awareness of how the Council's influence can best be applied and to develop a common strategy for the peaceful settlement of specific disputes.

The World Court

38. The docket of the International Court of Justice has grown fuller but it remains an under-used resource for the peaceful adjudication of disputes. Greater reliance on the Court would be an important contribution to United Nations peacemaking. In this connection, I call attention to the power of the Security Council under Articles 36 and 37 of the Charter to recommend to Member States the submission of a dispute to the International Court of Justice, arbitration or other dispute-settlement mechanisms. I recommend that the Secretary-General be authorized, pursuant to Article 96, paragraph 2, of the Charter, to take advantage of the advisory competence of the Court and that other United Nations organs that already enjoy such authorization turn to the Court more frequently for advisory opinions.

39. I recommend the following steps to reinforce the role of the International Court of Justice:

(a) All Member States should accept the general jurisdiction of the International Court under Article 36 of its Statute, without any reservation, before the end of the United Nations Decade of International Law in the year 2000. In instances where domestic structures prevent this, States should agree bilaterally or multilaterally to a comprehensive list of matters they are willing to submit to the Court and should withdraw their reservations to its jurisdiction in the dispute settlement clauses of multilateral treaties;

(b) When submission of a dispute to the full Court is not practical, the Chambers jurisdiction should be used;

(c) States should support the Trust Fund established to assist countries unable to afford the cost involved in bringing a dispute to the Court, and such countries should take full advantage of the Fund in order to resolve their disputes.

Amelioration through assistance

40. Peacemaking is at times facilitated by international action to ameliorate circumstances that have contributed to the dispute or conflict. If, for instance, assistance to displaced persons within a society is essential to a solution, then the United Nations should be able to draw upon the resources of all agencies and programmes concerned. At present, there is no adequate mechanism in the United Nations through which the Security Council, the General Assembly or the Secretary-General can mobilize the resources needed for such positive leverage and engage the collective efforts of the United Nations system for the peaceful resolution of a conflict. I have raised this concept in the Administrative Committee on Coordination, which brings together the executive heads of United Nations agencies and programmes; we are exploring methods by which the inter-agency system can improve its contribution to the peaceful resolution of disputes.

Sanctions and special economic problems

41. In circumstances when peacemaking requires the imposition of sanctions under Article 41 of the Charter, it is important that States confronted with special economic problems not only have the right to consult the Security Council regarding such problems, as Article 50 provides, but also have a realistic possibility of having their difficulties addressed. I recommend that the Security Council devise a set of measures involving the financial institutions and other components of the United Nations system that can be put in place to insulate States from such difficulties. Such measures would be a matter of equity and a means of encouraging States to cooperate with decisions of the Council.

Use of military force

42. It is the essence of the concept of collective security as contained in the Charter that if peaceful means fail, the measures provided in Chapter VII should be used, on the decision of the Security Council, to maintain or restore international peace and security in the face of a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression". The Security Council has not so far made use of the most coercive of these measures - the action by military force foreseen in Article 42. In the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, the Council chose to authorize Member States to take measures on its behalf. The Charter, however, provides a detailed approach which now merits the attention of all Member States.

43. Under Article 42 of the Charter, the Security Council has the authority to take military action to maintain or restore international peace and security. While such action should only be taken when all peaceful means have failed, the option of taking it is essential to the credibility of the United Nations as a guarantor of international security. This will require bringing into being, through negotiations, the special agreements foreseen in Article 43 of the Charter, whereby Member States undertake to make armed forces, assistance and facilities available to the Security Council for the

purposes stated in Article 42, not only on an ad hoc basis but on a permanent basis. Under the political circumstances that now exist for the first time since the Charter was adopted, the long-standing obstacles to the conclusion of such special agreements should no longer prevail. The ready availability of armed forces on call could serve, in itself, as a means of deterring breaches of the peace since a potential aggressor would know that the Council had at its disposal a means of response. Forces under Article 43 may perhaps never be sufficiently large or well enough equipped to deal with a threat from a major army equipped with sophisticated weapons. They would be useful, however, in meeting any threat posed by a military force of a lesser order. I recommend that the Security Council initiate negotiations in accordance with Article 43, supported by the Military Staff Committee, which may be augmented if necessary by others in accordance with Article 47, paragraph 2, of the Charter. It is my view that the role of the Military Staff Committee should be seen in the context of Chapter VII, and not that of the planning or conduct of peace-keeping operations.

Peace-enforcement units

44. The mission of forces under Article 43 would be to respond to outright aggression, imminent or actual. Such forces are not likely to be available for some time to come. Cease-fires have often been agreed to but not complied with, and the United Nations has sometimes been called upon to send forces to restore and maintain the cease-fire. This task can on occasion exceed the mission of peace-keeping forces and the expectations of peace-keeping force contributors. I recommend that the Council consider the utilization of peace-enforcement units in clearly defined circumstances and with their terms of reference specified in advance. Such units from Member States would be available on call and would consist of troops that have volunteered for such service. They would have to be more heavily armed than peace-keeping forces and would need to undergo extensive preparatory training within their national forces. Deployment and operation of such forces would be under the authorization of the Security Council and would, as in the case of peace-keeping forces, be under the command of the Secretary-General. I consider such peace-enforcement units to be warranted as a provisional measure under Article 40 of the Charter. Such peace-enforcement units should not be confused with the forces that may eventually be constituted under Article 43 to deal with acts of aggression or with the military personnel which Governments may agree to keep on stand-by for possible contribution to peace-keeping operations.

45. Just as diplomacy will continue across the span of all the activities dealt with in the present report, so there may not be a dividing line between peacemaking and peace-keeping. Peacemaking is often a prelude to peace-keeping - just as the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field may expand possibilities for the prevention of conflict, facilitate the work of peacemaking and in many cases serve as a prerequisite for peace-building.

V. PEACE-KEEPING

46. Peace-keeping can rightly be called the invention of the United Nations. It has brought a degree of stability to numerous areas of tension around the world.

Increasing demands

47. Thirteen peace-keeping operations were established between the years 1945 and 1987; 13 others since then. An estimated 528,000 military, police and civilian personnel had served under the flag of the United Nations until January 1992. Over 800 of them from 43 countries have died in the service of the Organization. The costs of these operations have aggregated some $8.3 billion till 1992. The unpaid arrears towards them stand at over $800 million, which represent a debt owed by the Organization to the troop-contributing countries. Peace-keeping operations approved at present are estimated to cost close to $3 billion in the current 12-month period, while patterns of payment are unacceptably slow. Against this, global defence expenditures at the end of the last decade had approached $1 trillion a year, or $2 million per minute.

48. The contrast between the costs of United Nations peace-keeping and the costs of the alternative, war - between the demands of the Organization and the means provided to meet them - would be farcical were the consequences not so damaging to global stability and to the credibility of the Organization. At a time when nations and peoples increasingly are looking to the United Nations for assistance in keeping the peace - and holding it responsible when this cannot be so - fundamental decisions must be taken to enhance the capacity of the Organization in this innovative and productive exercise of its function. I am conscious that the present volume and unpredictability of peace-keeping assessments poses real problems for some Member States. For this reason, I strongly support proposals in some Member States for their peace-keeping contributions to be financed from defence, rather than foreign affairs, budgets and I recommend such action to others. I urge the General Assembly to encourage this approach.

49. The demands on the United Nations for peace-keeping, and peace-building, operations will in the coming years continue to challenge the capacity, the political and financial will and the creativity of the Secretariat and Member States. Like the Security Council, I welcome the increase and broadening of the tasks of peace-keeping operations.

New departures in peace-keeping

50. The nature of peace-keeping operations has evolved rapidly in recent years. The established principles and practices of peace-keeping have responded flexibly to new demands of recent years, and the basic conditions for success remain unchanged: a clear and practicable mandate; the cooperation of the parties in implementing that mandate; the continuing support of the Security Council; the readiness of Member States to contribute

the military, police and civilian personnel, including specialists, required; effective United Nations command at Headquarters and in the field; and adequate financial and logistic support. As the international climate has changed and peace-keeping operations are increasingly fielded to help implement settlements that have been negotiated by peacemakers, a new array of demands and problems has emerged regarding logistics, equipment, personnel and finance, all of which could be corrected if Member States so wished and were ready to make the necessary resources available.

Personnel

51. Member States are keen to participate in peace-keeping operations. Military observers and infantry are invariably available in the required numbers, but logistic units present a greater problem, as few armies can afford to spare such units for an extended period. Member States were requested in 1990 to state what military personnel they were in principle prepared to make available; few replied. I reiterate the request to all Member States to reply frankly and promptly. Stand-by arrangements should be confirmed, as appropriate, through exchanges of letters between the Secretariat and Member States concerning the kind and number of skilled personnel they will be prepared to offer the United Nations as the needs of new operations arise.

52. Increasingly, peace-keeping requires that civilian political officers, human rights monitors, electoral officials, refugee and humanitarian aid specialists and police play as central a role as the military. Police personnel have proved increasingly difficult to obtain in the numbers required. I recommend that arrangements be reviewed and improved for training peace-keeping personnel - civilian, police, or military - using the varied capabilities of Member State Governments, of non-governmental organizations and the facilities of the Secretariat. As efforts go forward to include additional States as contributors, some States with considerable potential should focus on language training for police contingents which may serve with the Organization. As for the United Nations itself, special personnel procedures, including incentives, should be instituted to permit the rapid transfer of Secretariat staff members to service with peace-keeping operations. The strength and capability of military staff serving in the Secretariat should be augmented to meet new and heavier requirements.

Logistics

53. Not all Governments can provide their battalions with the equipment they need for service abroad. While some equipment is provided by troop-contributing countries, a great deal has to come from the United Nations, including equipment to fill gaps in under-equipped national units. The United Nations has no standing stock of such equipment. Orders must be placed with manufacturers, which creates a number of difficulties. A pre-positioned stock of basic peace-keeping equipment should be established, so that at least some vehicles, communications equipment, generators, etc., would be immediately available at the start of an operation. Alternatively,

Governments should commit themselves to keeping certain equipment, specified by the Secretary-General, on stand-by for immediate sale, loan or donation to the United Nations when required.

54. Member States in a position to do so should make air- and sea-lift capacity available to the United Nations free of cost or at lower than commercial rates, as was the practice until recently.

VI. POST-CONFLICT PEACE-BUILDING

55. Peacemaking and peace-keeping operations, to be truly successful, must come to include comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people. Through agreements ending civil strife, these may include disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.

56. In the aftermath of international war, post-conflict peace-building may take the form of concrete cooperative projects which link two or more countries in a mutually beneficial undertaking that can not only contribute to economic and social development but also enhance the confidence that is so fundamental to peace. I have in mind, for example, projects that bring States together to develop agriculture, improve transportation or utilize resources such as water or electricity that they need to share, or joint programmes through which barriers between nations are brought down by means of freer travel, cultural exchanges and mutually beneficial youth and educational projects. Reducing hostile perceptions through educational exchanges and curriculum reform may be essential to forestall a re-emergence of cultural and national tensions which could spark renewed hostilities.

57. In surveying the range of efforts for peace, the concept of peace-building as the construction of a new environment should be viewed as the counterpart of preventive diplomacy, which seeks to avoid the breakdown of peaceful conditions. When conflict breaks out, mutually reinforcing efforts at peacemaking and peace-keeping come into play. Once these have achieved their objectives, only sustained, cooperative work to deal with underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems can place an achieved peace on a durable foundation. Preventive diplomacy is to avoid a crisis; post-conflict peace-building is to prevent a recurrence.

58. Increasingly it is evident that peace-building after civil or international strife must address the serious problem of land mines, many tens of millions of which remain scattered in present or former combat zones. De-mining should be emphasized in the terms of reference of peace-keeping operations and is crucially important in the restoration of activity when

peace-building is under way: agriculture cannot be revived without de-mining and the restoration of transport may require the laying of hard surface roads to prevent re-mining. In such instances, the link becomes evident between peace-keeping and peace-building. Just as demilitarized zones may serve the cause of preventive diplomacy and preventive deployment to avoid conflict, so may demilitarization assist in keeping the peace or in post-conflict peace-building, as a measure for heightening the sense of security and encouraging the parties to turn their energies to the work of peaceful restoration of their societies.

59. There is a new requirement for technical assistance which the United Nations has an obligation to develop and provide when requested: support for the transformation of deficient national structures and capabilities, and for the strengthening of new democratic institutions. The authority of the United Nations system to act in this field would rest on the consensus that social peace is as important as strategic or political peace. There is an obvious connection between democratic practices - such as the rule of law and transparency in decision-making - and the achievement of true peace and security in any new and stable political order. These elements of good governance need to be promoted at all levels of international and national political communities.

VII. COOPERATION WITH REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONS

60. The Covenant of the League of Nations, in its Article 21, noted the validity of regional understandings for securing the maintenance of peace. The Charter devotes Chapter VIII to regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action and consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The cold war impaired the proper use of Chapter VIII and indeed, in that era, regional arrangements worked on occasion against resolving disputes in the manner foreseen in the Charter.

61. The Charter deliberately provides no precise definition of regional arrangements and agencies, thus allowing useful flexibility for undertakings by a group of States to deal with a matter appropriate for regional action which also could contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. Such associations or entities could include treaty-based organizations, whether created before or after the founding of the United Nations, regional organizations for mutual security and defence, organizations for general regional development or for cooperation on a particular economic topic or function, and groups created to deal with a specific political, economic or social issue of current concern.

62. In this regard, the United Nations has recently encouraged a rich variety of complementary efforts. Just as no two regions or situations are the same, so the design of cooperative work and its division of labour must adapt to the realities of each case with flexibility and creativity. In Africa, three

different regional groups - the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference - joined efforts with the United Nations regarding Somalia. In the Asian context, the Association of South-East Asian Nations and individual States from several regions were brought together with the parties to the Cambodian conflict at an international conference in Paris, to work with the United Nations. For El Salvador, a unique arrangement - "The Friends of the Secretary-General" - contributed to agreements reached through the mediation of the Secretary-General. The end of the war in Nicaragua involved a highly complex effort which was initiated by leaders of the region and conducted by individual States, groups of States and the Organization of American States. Efforts undertaken by the European Community and its member States, with the support of States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, have been of central importance in dealing with the crisis in the Balkans and neighbouring areas.

63. In the past, regional arrangements often were created because of the absence of a universal system for collective security; thus their activities could on occasion work at cross-purposes with the sense of solidarity required for the effectiveness of the world Organization. But in this new era of opportunity, regional arrangements or agencies can render great service if their activities are undertaken in a manner consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter, and if their relationship with the United Nations, and particularly the Security Council, is governed by Chapter VIII.

64. It is not the purpose of the present report to set forth any formal pattern of relationship between regional organizations and the United Nations, or to call for any specific division of labour. What is clear, however, is that regional arrangements or agencies in many cases possess a potential that should be utilized in serving the functions covered in this report: preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping, peacemaking and post-conflict peace-building. Under the Charter, the Security Council has and will continue to have primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, but regional action as a matter of decentralization, delegation and cooperation with United Nations efforts could not only lighten the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs.

65. Regional arrangements and agencies have not in recent decades been considered in this light, even when originally designed in part for a role in maintaining or restoring peace within their regions of the world. Today a new sense exists that they have contributions to make. Consultations between the United Nations and regional arrangements or agencies could do much to build international consensus on the nature of a problem and the measures required to address it. Regional organizations participating in complementary efforts with the United Nations in joint undertakings would encourage States outside the region to act supportively. And should the Security Council choose specifically to authorize a regional arrangement or organization to take the lead in addressing a crisis within its region, it could serve to lend the weight of the United Nations to the validity of the regional effort. Carried

forward in the spirit of the Charter, and as envisioned in Chapter VIII, the approach outlined here could strengthen a general sense that democratization is being encouraged at all levels in the task of maintaining international peace and security, it being essential to continue to recognize that the primary responsibility will continue to reside in the Security Council.

VIII. SAFETY OF PERSONNEL

66. When United Nations personnel are deployed in conditions of strife, whether for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping, peace-building or humanitarian purposes, the need arises to ensure their safety. There has been an unconscionable increase in the number of fatalities. Following the conclusion of a cease-fire and in order to prevent further outbreaks of violence, United Nations guards were called upon to assist in volatile conditions in Iraq. Their presence afforded a measure of security to United Nations personnel and supplies and, in addition, introduced an element of reassurance and stability that helped to prevent renewed conflict. Depending upon the nature of the situation, different configurations and compositions of security deployments will need to be considered. As the variety and scale of threat widens, innovative measures will be required to deal with the dangers facing United Nations personnel.

67. Experience has demonstrated that the presence of a United Nations operation has not always been sufficient to deter hostile action. Duty in areas of danger can never be risk-free; United Nations personnel must expect to go in harm's way at times. The courage, commitment and idealism shown by United Nations personnel should be respected by the entire international community. These men and women deserve to be properly recognized and rewarded for the perilous tasks they undertake. Their interests and those of their families must be given due regard and protected.

68. Given the pressing need to afford adequate protection to United Nations personnel engaged in life-endangering circumstances, I recommend that the Security Council, unless it elects immediately to withdraw the United Nations presence in order to preserve the credibility of the Organization, gravely consider what action should be taken towards those who put United Nations personnel in danger. Before deployment takes place, the Council should keep open the option of considering in advance collective measures, possibly including those under Chapter VII when a threat to international peace and security is also involved, to come into effect should the purpose of the United Nations operation systematically be frustrated and hostilities occur.

IX. FINANCING

69. A chasm has developed between the tasks entrusted to this Organization and the financial means provided to it. The truth of the matter is that our vision cannot really extend to the prospect opening before us as long as our financing remains myopic. There are two main areas of concern: the ability

of the Organization to function over the longer term; and immediate requirements to respond to a crisis.

70. To remedy the financial situation of the United Nations in all its aspects, my distinguished predecessor repeatedly drew the attention of Member States to the increasingly impossible situation that has arisen and, during the forty-sixth session of the General Assembly, made a number of proposals. Those proposals which remain before the Assembly, and with which I am in broad agreement, are the following:

Proposal one. This suggested the adoption of a set of measures to deal with the cash flow problems caused by the exceptionally high level of unpaid contributions as well as with the problem of inadequate working capital reserves:

(a) Charging interest on the amounts of assessed contributions that are not paid on time;

(b) Suspending certain financial regulations of the United Nations to permit the retention of budgetary surpluses;

(c) Increasing the Working Capital Fund to a level of $250 million and endorsing the principle that the level of the Fund should be approximately 25 per cent of the annual assessment under the regular budget;

(d) Establishment of a temporary Peace-keeping Reserve Fund, at a level of $50 million, to meet initial expenses of peace-keeping operations pending receipt of assessed contributions;

(e) Authorization to the Secretary-General to borrow commercially, should other sources of cash be inadequate.

Proposal two. This suggested the creation of a Humanitarian Revolving Fund in the order of $50 million, to be used in emergency humanitarian situations. The proposal has since been implemented.

Proposal three. This suggested the establishment of a United Nations Peace Endowment Fund, with an initial target of $1 billion. The Fund would be created by a combination of assessed and voluntary contributions, with the latter being sought from Governments, the private sector as well as individuals. Once the Fund reached its target level, the proceeds from the investment of its principal would be used to finance the initial costs of authorized peace-keeping operations, other conflict resolution measures and related activities.

71. In addition to these proposals, others have been added in recent months in the course of public discussion. These ideas include: a levy on arms sales that could be related to maintaining an Arms Register by the United Nations; a levy on international air travel, which is dependent on the maintenance of peace; authorization for the United Nations to borrow from the

World Bank and the International Monetary Fund - for peace and development are interdependent; general tax exemption for contributions made to the United Nations by foundations, businesses and individuals; and changes in the formula for calculating the scale of assessments for peace-keeping operations.

72. As such ideas are debated, a stark fact remains: the financial foundations of the Organization daily grow weaker, debilitating its political will and practical capacity to undertake new and essential activities. This state of affairs must not continue. Whatever decisions are taken on financing the Organization, there is one inescapable necessity: Member States must pay their assessed contributions in full and on time. Failure to do so puts them in breach of their obligations under the Charter.

73. In these circumstances and on the assumption that Member States will be ready to finance operations for peace in a manner commensurate with their present, and welcome, readiness to establish them, I recommend the following:

(a) Immediate establishment of a revolving peace-keeping reserve fund of $50 million;

(b) Agreement that one third of the estimated cost of each new peace-keeping operation be appropriated by the General Assembly as soon as the Security Council decides to establish the operation; this would give the Secretary-General the necessary commitment authority and assure an adequate cash flow; the balance of the costs would be appropriated after the General Assembly approved the operation's budget;

(c) Acknowledgement by Member States that, under exceptional circumstances, political and operational considerations may make it necessary for the Secretary-General to employ his authority to place contracts without competitive bidding.

74. Member States wish the Organization to be managed with the utmost efficiency and care. I am in full accord. I have taken important steps to streamline the Secretariat in order to avoid duplication and overlap while increasing its productivity. Additional changes and improvements will take place. As regards the United Nations system more widely, I continue to review the situation in consultation with my colleagues in the Administrative Committee on Coordination. The question of assuring financial security to the Organization over the long term is of such importance and complexity that public awareness and support must be heightened. I have therefore asked a select group of qualified persons of high international repute to examine this entire subject and to report to me. I intend to present their advice, together with my comments, for the consideration of the General Assembly, in full recognition of the special responsibility that the Assembly has, under the Charter, for financial and budgetary matters.

X. AN AGENDA FOR PEACE

75. The nations and peoples of the United Nations are fortunate in a way that those of the League of Nations were not. We have been given a second chance to create the world of our Charter that they were denied. With the cold war ended we have drawn back from the brink of a confrontation that threatened the world and, too often, paralysed our Organization.

76. Even as we celebrate our restored possibilities, there is a need to ensure that the lessons of the past four decades are learned and that the errors, or variations of them, are not repeated. For there may not be a third opportunity for our planet which, now for different reasons, remains endangered.

77. The tasks ahead must engage the energy and attention of all components of the United Nations system - the General Assembly and other principal organs, the agencies and programmes. Each has, in a balanced scheme of things, a role and a responsibility.

78. Never again must the Security Council lose the collegiality that is essential to its proper functioning, an attribute that it has gained after such trial. A genuine sense of consensus deriving from shared interests must govern its work, not the threat of the veto or the power of any group of nations. And it follows that agreement among the permanent members must have the deeper support of the other members of the Council, and the membership more widely, if the Council's decisions are to be effective and endure.

79. The Summit Meeting of the Security Council of 31 January 1992 provided a unique forum for exchanging views and strengthening cooperation. I recommend that the Heads of State and Government of the members of the Council meet in alternate years, just before the general debate commences in the General Assembly. Such sessions would permit exchanges on the challenges and dangers of the moment and stimulate ideas on how the United Nations may best serve to steer change into peaceful courses. I propose in addition that the Security Council continue to meet at the Foreign Minister level, as it has effectively done in recent years, whenever the situation warrants such meetings.

80. Power brings special responsibilities, and temptations. The powerful must resist the dual but opposite calls of unilateralism and isolationism if the United Nations is to succeed. For just as unilateralism at the global or regional level can shake the confidence of others, so can isolationism, whether it results from political choice or constitutional circumstance, enfeeble the global undertaking. Peace at home and the urgency of rebuilding and strengthening our individual societies necessitates peace abroad and cooperation among nations. The endeavours of the United Nations will require the fullest engagement of all of its Members, large and small, if the present renewed opportunity is to be seized.

81. Democracy within nations requires respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as set forth in the Charter. It requires as well a

deeper understanding and respect for the rights of minorities and respect for the needs of the more vulnerable groups of society, especially women and children. This is not only a political matter. The social stability needed for productive growth is nurtured by conditions in which people can readily express their will. For this, strong domestic institutions of participation are essential. Promoting such institutions means promoting the empowerment of the unorganized, the poor, the marginalized. To this end, the focus of the United Nations should be on the "field", the locations where economic, social and political decisions take effect. In furtherance of this I am taking steps to rationalize and in certain cases integrate the various programmes and agencies of the United Nations within specific countries. The senior United Nations official in each country should be prepared to serve, when needed, and with the consent of the host authorities, as my Representative on matters of particular concern.

82. Democracy within the family of nations means the application of its principles within the world Organization itself. This requires the fullest consultation, participation and engagement of all States, large and small, in the work of the Organization. All organs of the United Nations must be accorded, and play, their full and proper role so that the trust of all nations and peoples will be retained and deserved. The principles of the Charter must be applied consistently, not selectively, for if the perception should be of the latter, trust will wane and with it the moral authority which is the greatest and most unique quality of that instrument. Democracy at all levels is essential to attain peace for a new era of prosperity and justice.

83. Trust also requires a sense of confidence that the world Organization will react swiftly, surely and impartially and that it will not be debilitated by political opportunism or by administrative or financial inadequacy. This presupposes a strong, efficient and independent international civil service whose integrity is beyond question and an assured financial basis that lifts the Organization, once and for all, out of its present mendicancy.

84. Just as it is vital that each of the organs of the United Nations employ its capabilities in the balanced and harmonious fashion envisioned in the Charter, peace in the largest sense cannot be accomplished by the United Nations system or by Governments alone. Non-governmental organizations, academic institutions, parliamentarians, business and professional communities, the media and the public at large must all be involved. This will strengthen the world Organization's ability to reflect the concerns and interests of its widest constituency, and those who become more involved can carry the word of United Nations initiatives and build a deeper understanding of its work.

85. Reform is a continuing process, and improvement can have no limit. Yet there is an expectation, which I wish to see fulfilled, that the present phase in the renewal of this Organization should be complete by 1995, its fiftieth anniversary. The pace set must therefore be increased if the United Nations is to keep ahead of the acceleration of history that characterizes this age.

We must be guided not by precedents alone, however wise these may be, but by the needs of the future and by the shape and content that we wish to give it.

86. I am committed to broad dialogue between the Member States and the Secretary-General. And I am committed to fostering a full and open interplay between all institutions and elements of the Organization so that the Charter's objectives may not only be better served, but that this Organization may emerge as greater than the sum of its parts. The United Nations was created with a great and courageous vision. Now is the time, for its nations and peoples, and the men and women who serve it, to seize the moment for the sake of the future.

Notes

1/ See S/23500, statement by the President of the Council, section entitled "Peacemaking and peace-keeping".

2/ General Assembly resolution 37/10, annex.

3/ General Assembly resolution 43/51, annex.